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We extend the M&A and alliances literature to include a temporal perspective focusing 
on when and under what conditions firms should accelerate or slow down their M&A and 
alliance initiatives. Using a social entrainment model, we explore the relationship between the 
temporal properties of variability, synchronization and firm performance. We test our model in 
the context of the U.S specialty pharmaceutical industry. We find a curvilinear relationship 
between the overall variability of strategic actions and performance. Establishing internal 
synchronization increases performance while external synchronization of variability with 
competitors reveals a more complex picture. Our study further opens the window for 
understanding the creation of competitive advantage by managing rhythm-type strategic actions 
against time.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
"We're thoughtfully non-rhythmic", Mike Tomlin, Head Coach of the Pittsburgh 
Steelers1 
While the M&A and alliance literatures have a rich tradition, a temporal perspective 
exploring rhythm-type activity that focuses on when and under what conditions firms should 
accelerate or slow down their M&A and alliance initiatives has received scant attention.   Our 
research seeks to advance the temporal lens in the strategic management literature in general and 
in the M&A and alliance literature in particular.   We apply the social entrainment framework 
(McGrath & Kelly, 1986) and its associated temporal constructs of variability of activity change 
rate (Laamanen & Keil, 2008; McGrath & Kelly, 1986; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002) and 
synchronization or mutual entrainment, defined as the adjustment of one activity to match with 
that of another (Ancona and Chong, 1996).  Focusing on both M&A and alliances allows us to 
explore the performance impact of firms’ overall variability for these two initiatives.  
Additionally, we examine the performance impact of internally synchronizing M&A and alliance 
initiatives and the external synchronization of these strategic initiatives with their competitors. 
                                                 
1 Gene Collier, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 29, 2007. According to Collier, “His (Tomlin’s) thoughtfully 
non-rhythmic remark was crafted to explain that (training) camp schedule is designed to make players 
uncomfortable and unable to anticipate any pattern to the tasks, the better to sharpen their cognition and 
adaptability…”  In our context, we extend his meaning to reflect a desire to be semi-predictable not only to the 
players but to the other teams and coaches in the NFL.  See the theory development for hypothesis 1.  
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Our entrainment view suggests that M&A and alliance behaviors are rhythmic and are 
coordinated through internal and/or external synchronization mechanisms such as pacer, 
isomorphism, repetitive momentum (i.e., routines) and intentional strategic choice (Ancona and 
Chong, 1996).  Essentially, the entrainment perspective calls for a focus on when activities take 
place rather than what and how these activities occur and are implemented. Coordination of 
activity is achieved through an analysis of time rather than information processing requirements 
or activity.  Entrainment highlights the role of a temporal perspective of M&A and alliance 
initiatives by theoretically and methodologically recognizing the variability of these activities, 
their interdependence, the interplay between these activities and firms’ external environment and 
performance.   
The temporal dimension of strategy is embedded in a wide range of phenomenon , 
including, but not limited to first mover advantage (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), resource 
based view (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), 
decision making under uncertainty ( Eisenhardt, 1989), change management (Huy, 2001), and 
the real option perspective (Kogut, 1991).  While these research streams have provided 
significant practice and process insights, their central focus has not addressed temporal 
constructs such as tempo, cycles, variability of activity change rate and entrainments (with some 
excepts such as time-based competition).  A fundamental underpinning of strategic management 
logic lies in a prevailing focus on substance, i.e. what to do, over temporality, i.e. when, how 
fast, how often and how frequently to do. Thus, the temporality of strategy is relegated to a  
peripheral role (Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, & Tushman, 2001) in that time associated 
constructs and assumptions are not explicitly developed but implicitly assumed (Butler, 1995) 
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and often employed as methodological proxies for other constructs of interest.  For example, in 
the top management team literature, tenure is a methodological proxy for firm or industry 
knowledge, group cohesion, inertia, and harmonious working relationships (Mosakowski & 
Earley, 2000).  In the alliance literature, repeated partnering with the same firm is a proxy for 
trust and positive working relationships (Gulati, 1995). 
There are some notable exceptions with respect to our focus in the M&A and alliance 
streams.  For example, questions related to accelerating or slowing down post-acquisition 
integration (Homburg & Bucerius, 2006), preemptive acquisition (Carow, Heron, & Saxton, 
2004), M&A and alliance experience relationship with performance (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999) and M&A and alliances as learning tools and races (Hamel, 1991).  While these different 
thrusts offer unique contributions for enhancing our temporal understanding of M&A and 
alliance initiatives, two important temporal issues are underdeveloped.  First, their focus 
typically centers on a single M&A or alliance and therefore do not incorporate the nature of 
multiple strategic initiatives and their interplay (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1987). However, recent 
studies suggested that most firms engage in multiple M&As and alliances overtime (Frick & 
Torres, 2002; Laamanen & Keil, 2008). These M&A and alliances initiatives typically are part of 
the overall strategic portfolio program (Rovit & Lemire, 2003, Lavie, 2007) or part of firms’ core 
business routines (Ginsberg & Baum, 1994). The notion of serial acquirer (McNamara, 
Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008; Laamanen & Keil, 2008) and alliance portfolio (Hoffmann, 2007; 
Lavie, 2007; Parise & Casher, 2003) suggested that firms’ multiple M&A and alliance initiatives 
have become a norm rather than an exception in their overall strategic plan.  Second, those 
scholars that have recognized the interdependent nature among multiple M&A and alliances 
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(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) have not examined their periodicity, variability of the change 
rate of these initiatives and the fact that multiple initiatives can occur synchronously at the same 
level of analysis (e. g., firm) or across levels of analysis (firms and their competitive 
environment).  In other words, through the examination of these temporal properties, we can 
discern a pattern in the timing of M&A and alliances occurrences conditioned by internal or 
external pacers.   
Drawing on the social entrainment framework and its associated temporal constructs of 
variability of activity change rate and synchronization we demonstrate one approach for 
addressing the call to further incorporate a temporal lens into the M&A and alliance literature.   
Using a sample of small and medium sized biopharmaceutical firms we find a curvilinear 
relationship between their overall variability of M&A and alliance initiatives change rate with 
firm performance. In addition, our analysis shows that internal synchronization of variability 
between M&A and alliance enhances firm performance. As for external synchronization, the 
results are more complicated. Performance increased when firms synchronized their alliances 
with competitors’ alliance initiatives. However, synchronization of M&As with competitors did 
not enhance performance.  Our research identifies an important venue for corporate managers to 
rethink the way they design and coordinate repeated cycles of M&A and alliance activities.  
 4 
2.0  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 THE SOCIAL ENTRAINMENT FRAMEWORK AND STRATEGY 
The social entrainment model was borrowed from the biological sciences, in which the 
notion of entrainment refers to one cyclic process being captured by, and setting to oscillate in 
rhythm (or variability of activity change rate) with, another process. McGrath and Kelly (1986) 
were among the first to introduce the entrainment model in social science. The social 
entrainment model specifies that psychological and behavioral cycles can become entrained to 
other social or environmental processes. For example in universities, the academic calendar and 
faculty teaching/meetings are entrained. As McGrath and Kelly stated, “the social entrainment 
model provides a coherent framework for describing the operation of rhythmic process, their 
coupling to or synchronization with one another and potentially to outsider cues” (McGrath & 
Kelly, 1986, p 80).  
Incorporating strategic activities, such as M&A and alliance within the social entrainment 
framework allows strategy scholars to leverage a temporal lens in at least four ways.  First, 
studying temporal constructs such as variability of change rate and synchronization addresses the 
fundamental concerns of strategy, i.e. how firms behave and why firms differ? (Rumelt, 
Schendel, & Teece, 1994).  In particular, a temporal view that emphasizes the role of variability 
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and synchronization suggests a past-present-future link (when to do) and is in line with the 
conceptualization of strategy as emergent, dynamic, logically incremental, path dependent and 
patterns of interaction (Mintzberg, 1990).  
Secondly, the entrainment model can address rhythmic-type processes within firms as 
well as the interaction between firms and their environment. Therefore, it serves as a theoretical 
foundation for studying multiple activities and multi-level phenomena that are called for in 
strategy research (Pettigrew, 1992).  M&A and alliances can be viewed as two separate activities 
that have different momentums, variability, and trajectories. Alternatively, viewing M&A and 
alliances as internally embedded is consistent with the call for an explicit understanding of 
multiple activities at the same level of analysis (Pettigrew, 1992). Alignment between activities, 
as Powell (1992) concluded, can become a competitive advantage.  In our case, performance 
difference can also be linked to higher levels of analysis— the competitive environment in that 
multiple M&A and alliances can be observed at both the firm and industry levels.  
There are different ways that M&A and alliance activity can be mapped with time. 
Ancona and her associates (2001b), identify four types of activity mapping with time2. 
According to their classification, prior studies in the M&A and alliance domain mainly focus on 
single activity (transformation) mapping where key constructs of interest include duration, 
endurance, and trust (Inkpen & Currall, 2004). Other categories such as repeated activities 
mapping is less studied. The repeated activities category reflects the reoccurring nature of M&A 
                                                 
2 They are 1) single activity mapping to the continuum; 2) repeated activity mapping of the same activity 
multiple times on the continuum; 3) single activity transformation mapping of change processes, where one activity 
changes in character in response to a marker; 4) multiple activity mapping of two or more activities on the 
continuum; and 5) comparison and meshing of multiple temporal mappings with one another (Ancona, Okhuysen, & 
Perlow, 2001 p 515).  
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and alliance initiatives over a firm’s history. Two examples are Haleblian and Finkelstein’s 
(1999) examination of acquisition frequency and Hayward (2002) study of the interval between 
repetitions of acquisitions.  Our approach explores the meshing activity category, where multiple 
M&As and alliances are studied simultaneously allowing us to study internal and external 
synchronization.  
Thirdly, an entrainment view that stresses a rhythm-driven M&A and alliance approach 
complements the conventional opportunity driven approach.  A rhythm-driven approach is based 
on an assumption that managers purposely plan and implement M&A and alliance activities.  In 
large corporations, corporate development offices staffed with analysts often assume this role 
(Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). In the context of small and medium-sized firms, corporate 
development offices are not common or economically feasible.  However, small and medium-
sized firms are likely to adopt a rhythm-type M&A and alliance approach under two often 
interrelated circumstances.  First, for firms whose growth strategies are mostly driven by M&A 
and alliance initiatives one would expect to see such an approach.  Second, firms who lack 
capability or resources for internal growth development would adopt a rhythm-based approach to 
M&A and alliances.  In our setting, specialty pharmaceutical firms need to develop therapeutic 
product and relevant skill sets such as protein and gene-based technology. Either as a conscious 
choice or due to limited resources many small and medium sized firms have not developed 
capabilities to internally develop new products.  As a result, these firms will proactively search 
for targets and allying partners rather than passively wait for M&A and allying opportunities to 
emerge.  Our approach is consistent with and complements the opportunity-driven approach. We 
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suggest that corporate managers might develop a mindset to proactively seek partners or targets 
and infuse a rhythmic-type M&A and alliance initiatives into their routine system.  
 Lastly, the notion of entrainment provides a fresh perspective for the static vs. dynamic 
strategic fit debate (Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000). The entrainment view asserts that activities 
are embedded, interdependent and, to some extent, fit should be achieved by matching different 
activities along the time dimension. This serves two purposes to help clarify the fit debate. On 
the one hand, incorporating time directly allows for an understanding of the dynamics of why 
and how outcomes are differentially shaped by multiple ongoing activities. Second, we argue 
that fit has an inherent temporal characteristic that influences and is influenced by multiple 
activities within and external to systems.  
The social entrainment model employed here focuses on three temporal constructs, 
namely, the variability of M&A and alliance change rate, internal synchronization, defined as 
the variability synchronization between alliances and M&As within firms, and external 
synchronization, defined as variability synchronization between M&A and alliance activities of 
focal firms and their competitors.  
2.2 WHAT DOES VARIABILITY AND SYNCHRONIZATION MEAN IN M&A AND 
ALLIANCE ACTIVITIES CHANGE RATE? 
To organizational theorists, rhythm-type activities refer to the variability of the frequency 
of organizational activities (Huy, 2001) or the nature of cycles that periodically repeats (Ancona 
& Chong, 1996). Clearly, variability is a time construct that characterizes repeated activities 
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mapping.  In the M&A and alliance context, variability emphasizes the recurring nature of such 
frequency, i.e. the pattern of variability in the frequency of M&A and alliance initiatives. To this 
end, our major focus in discussing the rhythm-type M&A and alliance initiatives is the 
variability, consistence and regularity of the pattern across a specified time period.  
In biology, the study of rhythm-type behaviors has a long history. Many biological 
processes undergo regularly recurring quantitative and qualitative change. These processes are 
“repeated with such beat-like regularity that the processes are referred to as being rhythmic” 
(Brown, Hastings, & Palmer, 1970, p 1). For instance, bean seedlings which raise their leaves in 
daylight and lower them at night.  Biologists are confronted with the question: what is the origin 
of the rhythmical behaviors? Although there is no rigorous physicochemical explanation, two 
conjectures of rhythmic-type activity have emerged (Oatley & Goodwin, 1971) and we will draw 
on them for our synchronization hypotheses. The intrinsic view (cellular biochemical clock 
hypothesis) suggests that it is an essential dynamical feature of the observed process. The 
fundamental periodicities in living systems are the cycle of growth and division in cells, which 
need bear no relation to any environmental periodicity.  The extrinsic perspective (Hypothesis of 
environmental timing of the clock), on the other hand, maintains that such rhythm-type behaviors 
represent adaptive responses to a periodic environment such as solar or lunar system  For 
instance, Oatley and Goodwin (1971, p 7) argued “the most intensively studied of these 
phenomena are the 24-h rhythms relating to the solar day and 12 h tidal rhythms in marine 
organisms”. Biological scholars tend to agree that complicated periodic organisms can be 
understood as partly adaptive and partly of internal origin.  
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The origins of rhythm-type activities in corporate strategic actions can be understood in a 
similar way since the physiological processes of biologic organisms can be applied reasonably 
well to psychological processes of individual decision makers or to social-psychological 
mechanisms at the interacting dyads, groups or even larger organized social units (McGrath & 
Kelly, 1986).  Internally, a rhythmic-type M&A or alliance pattern can be formed through 
multiple means over time.  It can be influenced and shaped consciously by a top management 
team whose members have some sort of rhythmic-type orientation intended to achieve economic 
efficiency. Individuals who are more rhythmic will be more likely to reflect such a mindset in 
their actions. For example, major PC manufacturers release upgraded products at Christmas time 
each year in order to take advantage of newly released versions of software (i.e. Microsoft: 
games) or hardware (i.e. Intel: memory chips).  Events such as annual strategic planning create 
‘repetitive momentum’ providing a time-based routine for managers to reconsider or revise their 
M&A or alliance behaviors. In the case of small-medium size bio-pharmaceutical firms, M&A 
and alliance activity is largely driven by sales gaps3.  As a result, the overall level of M&A and 
alliance is not stable over time, with periods of sped-up activity and slowed down activity that is 
consciously driven.  
From an external perspective, the variability of M&A and alliance initiatives may be 
captured or entrained by external cyclic phenomena often reflected in isomorphic behavior. For 
instance, Jansen and Kristof-Brown (2005) reported that an individual’s working variability 
matches their working environment’s variability. Souza and associates (2004) found that the 
optimal variability of new product introduction is primarily driven by external industry 
                                                 
3 We thank George Lasezkay, a former Corporate Vice President, Business Development at Allergan, for identifying 
this rationale during our interview. 
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condition.  M&A and alliance initiatives can also be captured by external competitive dynamics 
such as competitor initiatives or regulatory change (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997).  
Building on the internal and external drivers of rhythm-type activity the main feature of 
these behaviors is revealed in stability properties as opposed to duration, magnitude, and 
frequency. The degree of stability or regularity differs across organizations. This can be 
understood in two extreme examples consistent with the resource based view that resources and 
capabilities are distributed heterogeneously among firms (Barney, 1991). On one hand, firms 
may conduct M&As or alliances without deliberate plotting along the temporal dimension, 
demonstrating a purely random or high variability process. On the other hand, firms may 
perceive time as a variable that can be purposely designed and effectively managed, making 
M&A and alliance activity a temporal regularity within which the pattern persists over time. In 
other words, firms differ in their capability to design their corporate strategy with respect to time. 
To this end, we suggested to focus directly on time as a theoretical and empirical construct rather 
than as a proxy for other constructs. Even Dierickx and Cool (1989) also recognized that time 
itself—not it proxy—may be an important input into capability creation process. Most firms 
clearly will not fall at the extremes of pure random or pure regularity. The differentiated 
variability pattern among firms reflects the underlying combination of firms’ distinctive 
capabilities including, but not limited to top management team, strategic planning, environmental 
scanning systems, history and managerial intent or vision regarding.  
Like the concept of variability, the notion of synchronization is largely derived from 
biological science. The intrinsic and extrinsic view of entrainment suggested that 
synchronization can occur both internally and externally. Within an organization, multiple 
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processes are entrained with each other (i.e., synchronized) through conscious decision 
processes, coordination, repetitive momentum and isomorphic mechanisms (McGrath and Kelly, 
1986). 
Social behavior can be entrained/synchronized to powerful external pacer event or cycles.  
However, external pacer events or cycles should be understood from an ontological assumption 
of co-evolution rather than an assumption of independence of the firm and its environment 
(Volberda  & Lewin, 2003).  We cannot understand these external pacers by separating them on 
their own since these exogenous forces are often endogenized over time. 
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3.0  HYPOTHESES 
3.1 VARIABILITY AND PERFORMANCE  
Variability of M&A and alliance rate can affect performance through its ability to 
coordinate internal events (Goodwin, 1970) or increase the predictability and hence the control 
of human behaviors.  Essentially, variability creates a dominant temporal order and reflects “the 
underlying dynamic equilibrium processes by which the many aspects of complex social 
systems” (McGrath & Kelly, 1986, p 89) or a series of repeated activities are coordinated.  
As argued above, neither a consistent nor an irregular variability of M&A and alliance 
rate will influence performance positively. An effective variability of M&A and alliance rate 
requires organizations to alternate between regularity and irregularity.  This suggests that 
organization can experience a regular variability of M&A and alliance rate for a period of time 
and then adjust their rate thereafter. From learning point of view, a regular or consistent pattern 
of corporate strategic actions is an effective strategy to coordinate learning processes across a 
series of repeated M&A and alliances (Hayward, 2002). Regularity can allow companies to 
absorb knowledge in a habitual temporal order and over time can facilitate the formation of a 
routine that is an essential element to managing uncertainty. However, regularity seldom allows 
companies to modify or revise their existing variability strategy and is prone to generate inertia 
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(Carroll & Hannan, 1990). With an orderly and consistent pattern of strategic actions, firms fail 
to recognize whether their current rhythm-type behavior is the most optimal. Minor adjustments 
can serve as a benchmark against which an existing variability can be compared, revised, and 
modified. A modification may also serve the purpose of time-brackets associated with learning 
processes, indicating that it is time to switch attention or to reach an end point of previous 
learning variability.  
From a resource availability perspective, a consistent variability of M&A and alliance 
rate allows companies to coordinate resource allocation processes in line with M&A and alliance 
activities. Vermeulen and Barkema (2002) found that organizations with regular expansion 
patterns can utilize but do not overstretch their absorptive capacity. As they posited, a rhythmical 
pattern characterized by consistency and predictability may reach a state of ‘flow’, suggested by 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1997), all of which is not available to firms that follows an unpredictable 
expansions path. Predictability indeed increases the efficiency and volume of absorptive capacity 
(Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). It also makes the resource allocation process more predictable 
and hence alleviates pressure from unexpected capital investment needs. For instance, Laamanen 
and Keil (2008) argued that predictability of acquisition rate can contributes to a smoother 
utilization of managerial capacity—one of the key resources in M&A initiatives. On the 
contrary, an uneven peak in the volume of M&A—unpredictable variability of M&A rate will 
push the firms to their capacity limits (Shaver, 2006), particularly considering that M&A and 
alliance-related managerial capacity cannot be increased or expanded significantly during short 
period of time, or even may not be possible in the long run (Penrose, 1959).  However, a regular 
or predictable variability of M&A and alliance rate reduces the diversity of absorptive capability. 
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Regular repetition of similar activities with a fixed variation implies a logic of linearity (Geibler, 
2002) and continuity, neither of which is essential building block for creativity. The development 
of creativity is not released by “a series of points and steps that follow one another in a regular 
fashion” (Geibler, 2002, p 134). Creative resource allocation processes require freedom, 
flexibility, and diverse forms of absorptive capability 
     In addition, unlike many internal initiatives which can be shielded from competitors’ 
attention, M&A and alliances are corporate actions easily caught by competitors’ radars.  M&A 
and alliances can be interpreted by competitors as a preemptive strategy to occupy a market or to 
acquire valuable resources. From an action and reaction point of view (Grimm & Smith, 1997), a 
regular pattern of M&A and alliances reduces within-firm variability (unpredictability) and 
hence the complexity of a firm’s sequence of competitive actions over time. In contrast, regular 
patterns coupled or alternated with adjustment and modification can increase the possibility of 
surprise actions, therefore limiting a competitor’s ability to map action and reaction cycles in an 
accurate way.  Simply put, semi-predictability generates the highest level of performance. To 
illustrate the concept of variability of M&A and alliance rate, we depict two contrasting pictures 
to demonstrate the difference between low variability (predictable, and consistent) and high 
variability (random, unpredictable) of M&A and alliance rate from firms in our sample. 
***Insert Figure 1 about here*** 
Hypothesis 1: Variability of M&A and alliance change rate has an inverted-U 
relationship with performance. i.e. a moderate level of variability (neither regular nor 
irregular(random)) of combined M&A and alliances initiatives rate generates the highest level of 
performance. 
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 The above argument rests on the assumption that our sample of pharmaceutical firms 
bundle their M&A and alliance initiatives under the guidance of corporate office. An alternative 
view suggests that M&A and alliance are unbundled (not coordinated). For this reason, we also 
examine M&A and alliance separately in our empirical setting.   
3.2 SYNCHRONIZATION OF VARIABILITY WITH THE EXTERNAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
External rhythm entrainment is defined as the congruence of variability between firms 
and their external environment. Despite scholars’ call for an understanding of rhythmic-type 
activity compatibility, little research has examined how synchronization of variability impact 
firm performance. Jansen and Kristof-Brown (2005) found that congruence of variability 
between individuals and their working environment can significantly influence individuals’ job 
satisfaction and their psychological stressfulness.  At the firm level, firms may experience 
similar effects when they fit/synchronize their variability to the competitive environment.  
While variability helps to coordinate internal events (Goodwin, 1970) external rhythmic 
compatibility can create a coordination interface between focal firms and their environment. 
Such congruence is more likely to be “satisfying” to firms since it creates order and coordinated 
interaction patterns out of chaos. It also is a “strain-reducing mechanism because it imposes less 
of a burden on an individual firm to attend to discordant eternal stimuli” (Jansen & Kristof-
Brown, 2005, p 95). These effects are transformed into a sense of control with respect to the 
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external environment. Therefore, external synchronous variability reduces focal firms’ 
uncertainty and increases their predictability about the external environment, which will further 
transform into increased control over key resources from the environment (such as experienced 
managers with sufficient knowledge in M&As or alliances—assuming these critical resources 
are in consistently in short supply due to the nature of path-dependency when accumulating or 
development these resources. In other words, synchronizing firms’ variability of M&A and 
alliance with competitors will, to some extent, alter the dependence relationship between focal 
firms and their competitors by minimizing their own dependence or by increasing the 
dependence of their competitors on them  (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Variability compatibility between firms and the external environment also validates 
behaviors in a mutually reinforcing manner through which firms feel comfortable about “social 
norms” (Jansen & Kristof-Brown, 2005). For instance, Williamson and Cable (2003: p 350) 
argued that “when focal firms face strong ambiguity about the environment, they are more likely 
to be motivated to monitor the actions of other organizations in their field in an effort to find 
viable solutions to organizational issue”.  In particular, the alignment of a firm’s variability of 
M&As and alliances with competitors can influence performance through its impact on the 
perception of other stakeholders (i.e. major shareholders, Wall Street analysts, etc). Our 
argument is also slightly different from the logics of institutional theory which predicts that 
performance will decrease when firms mimic and follow their competitors’ actions (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) due to bandwagon effect—firms are less likely to fully access the targets or 
partners and act in a rational manner (Song & Walkling, 2000). For serial acquirers or firm with 
alliance portfolio program (i.e. firms conducted multiple M&A or alliances), the proactive nature 
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of their acquiring or allying behaviors have been well interweaved into their internal routines. 
Therefore, these firms will less likely suffer from cost of “irrational” bandwagon effect. For 
instance, McNamara et al (2008) found that acquisition routines will help generate procedural 
memory that focuses on general acquisition issues, such as target value assessment and strategic 
fit rather than on the identification of the emerging opportunities that drive the acquisition 
bandwagon behavior. ,  
   Hypothesis 2:  Firms that synchronize their variability of combined M&A and alliances 
initiatives change rate with that of their competitors achieve higher levels of performance. 
 
Again, we also investigate the unbundled initiatives that separate M&A and alliance.  
3.3 INTERNAL SYNCHRONIZATION OF VARIABILITY BETWEEN M&A AND 
ALLIANCE 
While external variability compatibility allows firms to better control their environment 
and increase the accuracy of predicting the future, internal variability congruence can achieve a 
similar goal, i.e. more control over and predictability of the internal environment. McGrath and 
Kelly (1986, p 90) argued that internal synchronization of variability will result in a “dynamic 
equilibrium” in which specific process patterns, that constitute a balanced or steady state, change 
over time and do so in systematic ways. Such a “dynamic equilibrium”, in our view, can be 
achieved in two ways in the cases of M&A and alliance initiatives. In Figure 2, we demonstrate 
synchronization of M&A and alliance graphically.    
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***Insert Figure 2 about here*** 
First, when M&As and alliances initiatives proceed simultaneously within a firm, it can 
establish a minimum levels of overlap between each activity. Such an overlap establishes a 
foundation for information exchange between M&As and alliances. For instance, knowledge 
acquired from experiential learning in M&As can be shared and utilized in experiential learning 
of alliances if the underlying knowledge structure (such as target/partner selection) of M&As and 
alliances are similar.  Knowledge from each type of activity can cross-fertilize, spillover or 
reinforce the value of the other (Zollo & Reuer, 2001) creating repetitive momentum. This type 
of logic has been empirical examined in the product development literature where Lilly and 
Walters (1997) reported that pairing two new product development efforts can generate 
numerous benefits such as timely information sharing, building interest and demand for the new 
product, and obtaining feedback from customers. 
Second, Albert (1995) argued that the synchronization of multiple activities can 
strengthen their cumulative effect. It creates a heightened sense of beginning or of ending for 
organization members. Our arguments go beyond that. We suggest that such a heightened sense 
of time can create an institutionalized temporal map for members to adhere to and coordinate 
with. This will result in advantages over firms who did not synchronize their internal M&As and 
alliances. On one hand, internal variability compatibility smoothes the resource allocation 
process through deploying resources to the “right activities at the right time”. The combined 
effect is far from additive or cumulative, but rather interwoven in a systematic order, which 
creates complexity for competitors to understand and predict. On the other hand, a synchronized 
variability of internal activities speaks to the resource based view, i.e. the pattern of 
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synchronization becomes an integrated element within firms’ activity systems that jointly, is hard 
to imitate, socially complex, and causally ambiguous.  
Hypothesis 3:  Firms that internally synchronize their variability of M&A change rate 
with variability of alliances change rate achieve higher levels of performance. 
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4.0  METHDOLOGY 
4.1 INDUSTRY CONTEXT 
We define specialty pharmaceuticals as those firms that mainly deal with expensive 
medications that treat rare, chronic diseases inflicting a small proportion of people (Employee 
Benefit News. 2005). Those special diseases include but not limited to Heophilia, Hepatitis C, 
Ocology, HIV/AIDs and transplant, which usually have been classified as an orphan disease4. 
The companies in our sample typically occupy a niche market that was either ignored or 
neglected by large pharmaceutical firms. In this study, we adopt a broad definition of specialty 
pharmaceutical firms to also include generic drug firms into our sample. From a market niche 
perspective, these generic firms have positioned themselves in a niche market where big 
pharmaceutical firms have either been unable to or not been willing to compete. Our inclusion of 
generic firms is not without validity. For instance, Banc of American has a specialty 
pharmaceutical report that includes both specialty firms and generic drug companies.  
The specialty pharmaceutical sector is a rapidly growing market with annual increase of 
43% from 2002 to 2005, a much faster pace than the 10.2% average increase in drug spending in 
                                                 
4 For instance, in United States, if a particular disease has less than 200,000 people with that condition; that is 
classified by the federal government as an orphan disease. We thank Dick Rylander, former president and founder of 
biopharmaceutical Strategies, LLC to bring this issue up. 
 21 
general (Mergers & Acquisitions Report, 2006). The growth of specialty drug is particular strong 
in U.S. It is estimated, by 2010, specialty drug spending in the U.S. could reach $99 billion by 
2010, nearly double the $54 billion spent in 2006 (Wall Street Journal, 2008). The fast growing 
specialty drug industry is largely due to 1) big pharmaceutical firms’ lack of interest or ignorance 
of niche market, 2)the change of patient trend (i.e. from acute therapy to chronic therapy), 3) 
released resource space in different therapeutic areas due to intense competition among giant 
generalist pharmaceutical firms, and 4) the development of supporting industries and agencies 
(i.e. venture capital industry and government regimes), 5) higher profit markup due to high price 
(usually as much as 250% of its cost). 
The competitive arena in the specialty areas is quite different from that in traditional 
pharmaceutical field. The industry is rather young and firms within this particular industry 
compete in several ways. For public firms, they are competing for public investor, so their stock 
prices will go up. They also compete for strategic partners--the big pharmaceutical firms, which 
is also a form of financing. For instance, they compete for strategic partners for the purpose of 
funding their clinic three stage testing on large human population5. In addition to that, they also 
compete for large pharmaceutical firms’ collaboration for marketing or manufacturing their in-
house products. Meanwhile, specialty drug firms also compete for acquisition target in an 
attempt to generate financial capital to support their other developments. Since the number of 
partners and targets is limited, a proactive allying or acquiring strategy is highly important for 
                                                 
5 Typically, there are four stages in the development of drug, one pre-clinical stage and three phases of clinical trials. 
Phase 1 is all about safety with a small number of people. Phase 2 is about beginning to show some efficacy. In 
Phase 3, firms should achieve statistically validity based on large population. The total cost of running phase 1,2,3 is 
in excess of a hundred million dollars. In particular, phase 1 and 2 may not be a major hurdle for most small 
specialty firms. It is phase 3 that is most costly and risky. If failed, the company’s prospect will be quickly in 
jeopardy. Small specialty firms usually partner with large pharmaceutical firms to access latter’ financial and human 
capitals to conduct phase 3 clinical trials. 
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firms to secure valuable, rare assets and resources and to timely access market information. As 
we discussed above, this also constitute a good setting for examining synchronization of M&A 
and alliance initiatives since these activities are likely to be captured by external competitive 
dynamics when an industry is highly competitive due to limited availability of partners or 
targets.    
The motivation for acquisition and alliance is quite different for giant pharmaceutical 
firms from that of small and young specialty firms. For instance, generic drug firms usually 
desire to achieve instant economies of scale (i.e. manufacturing and administrative capacity) 
through acquisition rather than use excessive capacity due to patent expiration to acquire other 
pharmaceutical firms (which is common for large pharmaceutical firms) (Danzon, Nicholson, & 
Pereira, 2005). For small and young specialty drug companies, they prefer M&A strategy 
(purchasing marketed drugs, etc) to generate sufficient revenue in the hope that it can be used to 
fund their innovative projects. The motivation for alliance is also quite unique to small and 
young specialty drug firms. Most likely, they prefer to achieve commercial application of their 
in-house innovative technological capabilities and to engage in new activities (e.g. drug 
commercialization in global pharmaceutical markets). Since small specialty drug companies 
usually do not have downstream function, they have to draw on big-pharmaceutical firms to 
manufacture or market their products, particularly when markets for a specific drug are small due 
to the nature of the disease. Through this way, small and young specialty drug firms can 
significantly reduce their cost to search for policy requirements of pricing, reimbursement and 
promotional efforts in different markets and countries. To this end, it is important for small 
specialty drug firms to proactively maintain their acquisition and alliance initiatives  rather than 
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wait for these opportunities to emerge. Therefore, the fact that these firms have limited functions 
along the industry value chain also establish a suitable context for studying temporal features 
such as variability and synchronization.  
Furthermore, small specialty drug firms also cooperate with large pharmaceutical firms 
to obtain sufficient financial and human resources in an effort to conduct costly phase three 
clinical trials, which require statistically validity based on large population. To quote a senior 
pharmaceutical executive: “So you need data that shows that you have a lead chemical 
compound. And then you need to partner with somebody who’s got the resources to actually 
conduct that Phase 3 clinical trial. And that’s really been the model that all these companies now 
use. Get good data and then form a strategic alliance with somebody big, somebody who has 
deep enough pockets to bring the thing to market”. Recent research also shows that products 
developed in an alliance between small and large pharmaceutical firms tend to have a higher 
probability of success (i.e. getting approval eventually), particularly in more complex phase 3 
trials (Danzon et al., 2005; DiMasi, 2000; Arora, Gambardella, Pommolli, & Riccaboni, 2000)6. 
In addition, large pharmaceutical firms also prefer cooperating with small specialty firms on 
developing phase 3 drugs, because the probability of success in phase 3 is usually 73% compare 
with 7% at pre-clinical stage, 23% at phase 1 and 33 at phase 2 (Fischette, 2004). These numbers 
also reflect the fact that the pharmaceutical business involves huge risk. The risk is usually much 
higher for small specialty drug firms than for giant pharmaceutical firms. If product development 
                                                 
6 On the contrary, Pisano (1997) argued the opposite, i.e. product co-developed in an alliance are less likely to 
succeed in clinical trials than drugs that developed by a single small firm. He proposed a “lemons” hypothesis that 
stressed the information advantages small firms have regarding their drug candidates. Danzon et al (2005: p7) 
argued that “the positive benefit from collaboration with a more experienced partner appears to dominate any moral 
hazard effect that might result from the sharing of gains in alliance, and any lemons or adverse selection effects”. 
 24 
fails, the small specialty drug companys’ prospect will be in jeopardy. It is important to develop 
a temporal strategy that emphasizes variability and synchronization in these industries setting 
since a well developed temporal routine can smooth out the risks in the long run.   
Finally, small specialty firms’ motivation to ally with large pharmaceutical firms is also 
related with transfer of status and signaling effect. Small specialty firms or young biotechnology 
firms suffer from liability of smallness and/or newness. The strategy literature suggested that 
they can increase their survival chance and access to external resources by gaining legitimacy via 
ties with prestigious businesses (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999; Gulati & Higgins, 2003). In the 
competitive arena, small specialty firms compete for finance and investors’ attention. Allying 
with a large pharmaceutical firm allow small specialty drug firms to send signals of their quality 
to financial markets under the assumption that there is information asymmetry between specialty 
firms and investors, and pharmaceutical firms can better evaluate the quality of these small 
specialty drug firms’ technological know-how and managerial capabilities. This assumption is 
quite true particularly when small firms are operate in specialty domains where knowledge are 
quite specialized and therefore less likely be evaluated accurately by general public investors and 
venture capitalists. In other words, pharmaceutical firms, in this case, perform a validating 
function which is usually assumed by financial intermediaries (Nicholson, Danzon, McCullough, 
2005).   
We selected this industry for several reasons consistent with our theoretical logic. First, 
for small and young specialty pharmaceutical firms, their growth strategies are largely driven by 
M&A and alliances activities. As we mentioned above, the M&A and alliance growth-driven 
strategy provides an ideal context for firms to develop rhythm in these strategic initiatives. An 
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M&A and alliance growth-driven strategy allows firms to develop skills to facilitate and 
institutionalize a temporal map for their multiple M&A and alliance activities. Second, specialty 
pharmaceutical firms often do not posses the requisite complementary resources and knowledge 
for in-house development activities; they instead rely on partner firms for important resources 
such as finance, marketing and manufacturing (Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001)7. The lack of 
internal capabilities to develop these resources suggests that these firms are more likely to search 
for targets or partners proactively. Their M&A and alliance initiatives are less likely to be driven 
opportunistically. Third, small, young and specialized firms are regarded as a driving force for 
industrial renewal and innovation (Audretsch, 1995). Their survival environment is extremely 
dynamic and competitive advantage often accrues to those firms that can manage the temporality 
of their collaborative activities (Barkema, Baum, & Mannix, 2002). In particular, small and 
young firms have an incentive to adopt a synchronization strategy since these firms usually do 
not have deeply-rooted organizational inertia and are willing to follow their competitors’ 
variability of M&A and alliance initiatives. In other words, these small firms, compared with 
giant pharmaceutical firms, have more discretion to organize the rhythm-type behaviors and their 
synchronization by design. 
 Finally, we also unpack our data to achieve a better understanding of the overall features 
of our sample firms’ M&A and alliance initiatives. We find that on average, our sample firms 
conduct 0.32 acquisitions and 0.09 alliances a year, which is quite low compared with giant 
pharmaceutical firms (For instance, Abbott conduct 10 acquisitions in 2006). The low frequency 
context is actually important for us to study variability and synchronization strategy.  A low 
                                                 
7 George Lasezkay, former Corporate Vice President, Business Development at Allergan also pointed this out during 
our interview.  
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number of acquisitions and alliances allows firms to more easily keep track of their temporal 
features such as variability. It also helps them synchronize their variability with competitors 
since the cognitive ability that is required for rhythm-type activity and synchronization does not 
pose a significant challenge in this context.       
4.2 SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION 
We developed several criteria to select our sample. These criteria are 1) the firms have 
value chain activities in the pharmaceutical industry (SIC 2834). 2) Through the search of 
company websites, annual reports and major pharmaceutical industry journals and proceedings, 
we identified key words such as special drug, specialty pharmacy, special patients need, niche 
etc that distinguish the selected firms from traditional pharmaceutical giants. 3) firms listed on 
either the NYSE or NASDAQ. This ensures that we have complete access to relevant financial 
data through COMPUSTAT.  Our procedure generated 58 listed companies in the global 
specialty pharmaceutical industry (SIC 2834). There are two types of firms in this industry 
sector; 1) specialty pharmaceutical firms that produce expensive medications that treat rare, 
chronic diseases inflicting a small proportion of people, such as Gucher’s disease and hemophilia 
(Employee Benefit News, 2005) and 2) Generic pharmaceutical firms that produce branded 
medications at a lower cost due to patent expiration, such as Watson and Teva. These two types 
of firms have a common defining characteristic, i.e. they all have limited product lines, due to 
either smaller market demand or limited availability of products whose patents are close to 
expiration.  They occupy a special niche in the overall pharmaceutical market and compete in a 
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very different domain from the traditional pharmaceutical giants8.  We control for the type of 
firm. To provide additional validity for our selection procedure, we had two pharmaceutical 
industry managers provide an assessment of the firms we selected. The correlation was 0.98.  
We obtained alliances and acquisitions data from Thomson Financial Security Data 
Company’s (SDC) database. The SDC database has been extensively used in alliance (Carow et 
al., 2004), and M&A (Oxley & Sampson, 2004) research. The time period for our study spans 
the years 1985 to the end of 2003 because the SDC dataset has more complete information 
coverage after the middle 1980s. During this period, two important events occurred in the U.S 
that shaped the evolution of specialty pharmaceutical industry. The first was the enactment of 
Orphan Drug Act in 1984 that created incentives to encourage manufacturers to develop products 
for diseases affecting relatively small numbers of patients. Following the act’s passage, many 
drugs were developed and introduced addressing these relatively rare diseases. The second was 
the U.S Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, informally known as the 
"Hatch-Waxman Act", also enacted in 1984, for the purpose of standardizing U.S. procedures for 
recognition of generic drugs.  
Although the SDC database is far from perfect, it nevertheless is the most comprehensive 
source on alliances and M&A announcements compared with other databases. We used annual 
reports and (10-Ks) to corroborate data obtained from the SDC database. Therefore, we are 
confident that our data derived from the SDC accurately reflects the M&A and alliance activity 
for our sample firms.   
                                                 
8 An alterative view would be a dynamic interplay between specialists and generalists during the resource 
partitioning process (Carroll & Hannan, 1990). Given the fact that most resources partitioning processes often take 
extremely long periods of time, our 19 years dataset will not reveal such a process. 
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We established the following criteria to select alliance and M&A deals; 1. Only 
completed deals are included. We delete cases that were pending, intended or ambiguous 
(rumor). 2. For M&A, we do not include cases that suggest self tender (stock buyout). 3. The 
target in an acquisition is either a firm that has legal entity, or a specific product line or division. 
Finally, we obtained financial data from COMPSTAT industry annual database and information 
regarding firms’ growth stage through interviews with industry experts, industry journals, annual 
reports and company websites.  
One caveat is that we do not include internal development initiatives because firms in our 
sample are likely to base their growth strategies on M&A and alliance initiatives due to their lack 
of internal development capabilities and resources. Nevertheless we use R&D intensity as a 
proxy for the opportunity for internal development to control for its potential impact.  
Our final sample consists of 57 listed firms 9 with 42110  observations over the period 
1985 to 2003. Since some of our sample firms were established after 1990, not every firm has 
coverage of nineteen years. Our method accommodates this reality. 
                                                 
9 We drop 1 firm because it was obviously a division (subsidiary) of a larger diversified company. 
10 We used 373 observations in regression since we lagged our dependent variable for 1 year.   
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4.3 VARIABLES AND MEASURES 
4.3.1 Independent Variables 
Variability of M&A and alliance change rate.  We measure variability of M&A and 
alliance rate in two different ways in to order to establish construct reliability. First, we measure 
it through the kurtosis of the first derivative of the number of M&As and alliances over time. 
This measure has been used in international management literature where scholars examine 
foreign expansion process (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). The kurtosis of distribution is as 
follow: 
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Where n=number of observation, xi = number of strategic actions (M&A and alliances) in 
year i, and s = standard deviation of the number of strategic actions. Higher kurtosis means more 
of the variance is due to infrequent extreme deviations, as opposed to frequent modestly-sized 
deviations. Therefore, a very regular and constant variability of strategic actions will result in a 
relatively flat distribution and therefore a lower kurtosis (called platykurtic, a distribution which 
has a smaller "peak" around the mean).  In contrast, purely random pattern of strategic actions 
will result in a high value of kurtosis measure (called leptokurtic which has a more acute "peak" 
around the mean).  
Second, we use the number of M&A and alliances as a dependent variable and regress it 
on time over the period 1985 to 2003. We then divide the standard error of the regression slope 
coefficient by its mean value (Dess and Beard, 1984).  This measure reflects the dispersion about 
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a trend line when controlling for the absolute number of M&As and alliances of each firm. An 
advantage of this measure is that it takes the ordering of data points and the trend line of time 
into consideration, which is theoretically in line with our focus of time as a causal variable.   
Internal Synchronization. The concept of internal synchronization methodologically, is 
similar to the perspective of organizational alignment or strategic fit (Venkatraman, 1989) We 
adopted the “fit as matching” perspective and choose the corresponding deviation score analysis 
as an analytic tool for two reasons. First, Powell (1992) argued that when variables are 
endogenous or when they are subject to managers’ design or control the “fit as matching” 
perspective is preferable. The variability of two internal processes, namely M&A and alliances, 
can plausibly be interpreted by managers from a matching perspective. Second, the concept of 
entrainment implies that different processes adopt similar variability.  
The deviation score analysis method is based on a premise that the absolute difference 
between the scores of two variables indicates a lack of fit and the performance implications of fit 
is therefore tested by examining the impact of this difference (Venkatraman, 1989, p 431; 
Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990). A formal equation is as follows: 
ε+−+++= )(3210 ZXaZaXaaY  
Where X is the variability of M&A, Z is the variability of alliance.  If  is negative and 
statistically significant, then a “fit as matching” hypothesis is supported. 
3a
External Synchronization. Because our measure of competitors’ variability is created by 
averaging the variability of proximal competitors (in terms of stage of firm development), the 
reliability of the difference score is reduced because the focal firm’s variability may share some 
variance with its competitors’ variability. Under this situation, polynomial regression analysis is 
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a better alternative to difference score analysis (Edwards, 2002). In essence, polynomial 
regression replaces differences scores with a component measure that constitute the difference 
and higher-order terms such as the squares and product of these measures (Edwards, 2002, p 2). 
The polynomial regression takes the following form: 
ε++++++= 25423210 CbRCbRbCbRbbP  
in which P represents firm performance, R is firm’s variability of acquisitions (alliances), 
C is the competitors’ level of variability of acquisitions (alliances).  
Because competitors’ variability is a higher level of analysis than the focal firm, we, 
therefore, incorporated the polynomial regression model within hierarchical linear modeling 
(HLM) to control for the shared variance in the measures of the competitors’ variability—a 
technique that scholars refer to as cross-level polynomial regression (Jansen & Kristof-Brown, 
2005). The resulting set of HLM equations were specified as 
Level 1 equation:  ijkijijijtij rRRP +++= 2210 βββ
Level 2 equation:  ijjjjij CC 0
2
0201000 μββββ +++=
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Level 3 equation:  
00000 γβ =j , 01001 γβ =j , 02002 γβ =j , 10010 γβ =j , 11011 γβ =j , 20020 γβ =j  
The HLM model statement indicates that performance was influenced by focal firms’ 
variability of M&A and alliance rate, their competitors’ variability of M&A and alliance rate, 
their product and their square term respectively. The cross-level equations also suggested that the 
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data where nested by year (level 3 equation) and stage of firms (level 2 equation), i.e. firm-year 
observations were nested within year, which were further nested within firm stages.   
4.3.2 Dependent Variable 
Performance.  Researchers investigating firm performance in the pharmaceutical industry 
have used a variety of measures: ROE, ROS, new product development and patents (Rothaermel, 
2001; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). We use the market-based financial performance measure 
Tobin’s Q, computed as the sum of market value of equity (common shares outstanding x the 
closing stock price), the liquidating value of preferred stock, and the book value of debt divided 
by the book value of assets (Chung and Pruitt, 1994) for two reasons. First, many of our sample 
firms are relatively young (around 20 years) compared with most pharmaceutical giants because 
specialty pharmaceuticals is a recent phenomenon. In fact, many specialty pharmaceutical firms 
generate negative return in their early years, which is normal for most young organizations. 
Therefore, performance measures based on return on sales, equities, or assets do not accurately 
capture the ability of these organizations to create value. Our interview with pharmaceutical 
industry experts also lends support to this argument. For instance, George Lasezkay, one of our 
interviewees, noted that “many of these companies go public and they don’t have commercial 
infrastructures. They are still conducting largely R&D. So now how did you measure what it is 
their performance? And to me, about the only way to do that before they become commercially 
oriented is:  has the stock price gone up as a result of it?  or are the shareholders happy?” 
Second, the Tobin’s Q ratio reflects a firm’s ability to create efficiency. It aims to 
measure a company’s strategic performance (Chakravarthy, 1986) which is in line with 
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investors’ and other stakeholders’ perceptions of a firm’s value creation. To facilitate causal 
inference, we lagged Tobin’s Q by one year11.  Tobin’s Q tends to be skewed (the normality 
assumption is violated), we therefore use a log transformation.  As a robust check, we include 
ROA (with one year lead) as a performance measure and expect non-significant results.  
4.3.3 Control Variables.   
We measure firm size by asset (log)12 since previous studies have indicated that firm size 
can influence firm performance (Skaggs & Youndt, 2004). Tobin’s Q is strongly influenced by 
firms’ growth potential. Firms with higher growth momentum are perceived by investors as 
valuable and more profitable in the long run. We therefore use the percentage of asset growth in 
year i compared with year i-1 to capture this effect13. We also control for internal development 
measured by R&D intensity14. In addition to that, we also use patent as a proxy for internal 
development in lieu of R&D intensity. Our results do not change significantly. We found patent 
is highly correlated with R&D intensity (γpr= 0.89). We, therefore, only include R&D intensity in 
the final results15. The life cycle stage of a firm may impact its market value. Firms in the 
emerging stage are subject to liability of newness and are vulnerable to environment selection. 
Specialty pharmaceutical firms in the emerging stage may have potential blockbuster products 
                                                 
11 We also use three year forward moving average Tobin’s Q (log), results do not change significantly.  
12 We also replace asset with number of employee (log), no significant change was found.  
13 We also use growth of sales and the number of employee. The results are the quite similar. Since sales and assets 
are highly correlated, we only report asset in our analysis. 
14 We use 1 year and three year moving average of R&D intensity. Results do not differ. We reported 1 year in the 
result section.  
15 The results are also in consistent with our interview with George Lasezkay, former Corporate Vice President, 
Business Development at Allergan. He pointed out that the key is to achieve market exclusivity, while patent is just 
one way to achieve that and companies can have lots of other way to do it.  
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that have extremely high market uncertainty. We controlled for inter-temporal trends with year 
dummy variables. We also control for firm’s acquisition and alliance experience. We measure 
experience by the accumulated number of acquisition and alliance each firm conducts each year. 
The remaining controls include profitability measured by return on assets (For models that use 
Tobin’s Q only), debt-to-equity ratio as a measure of financial leverage, and product 
characteristics (whether it produces branded or generic products). We control for industry effects 
using a dummy variable since some of our sample firms’ primary SIC code is not 2834.  Finally, 
to eliminate the alternative hypothesis that Tobin’s Q is driven by the overall market, we use the 
Dow Jones index to control for overall stock market movement.  
4.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
To test hypotheses 1 and 3, we analyze our panel data using feasible generalized least 
square (FGLS) regression. FGLS regression can deal with autocorrelation within panels (AR1) 
and heteroskekasticity across panels (Greene, 2000)16 17.  We prefer FGLS for two reasons. First, 
it is only appropriate to use GLS estimator when a sample has a large number of panels relative 
                                                 
16 In stata, we use the option corr (ar1) force and panel (hetero) to model both autocorrelation and heteroskekasticity 
effects. We did not model cross-sectional correlation effect since it only makes sense to assume that the error terms 
of panels are correlated when panels are balanced and when the number of time period is greater than the number of 
panels.  
17 Since the number of observations for each firm is not the same in our sample, the panel dataset is therefore 
unbalanced. To take this information into account, we use the xtpcse function and np1 option in Stata. These 
functions calculate panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates for linear cross-sectional time-series models 
where the parameters are estimated by Paris-Winsten regression and specify that the panel-specific autocorrelations 
are weighted by the number of observations in each panel  (Greene, 2000). These results differ little from the results 
of FGLS estimation. We therefore concluded that the unbalanced panel does not pose a major threat to the validity 
of our results. Only results from FGLS model are reported.  
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to time periods18(Stata, 2005). Second, the FGLS estimator addresses more complex 
heteroskekasticity problems19 compared with GLS estimator. In particular, when we test 
different scores between variability of M&A and alliance, each firm may have a different 
number of M&A and alliances. This results in more complex heteroskekasticity issues which 
arise from different variances among firms in addition to non-constant variance over time.  
To test non-linear relationships, we use the square term of variability. For hypotheses 1 
and 3, we test models using Tobin’s Q (Model 1-7) and ROA (Model 8-14). To test Hypothesis 
2, as stated above, we use cross-level polynomial regression to control for the shared variance in 
the measures of competitors’ variability. We also use three-dimensional surface plot analysis to 
graphically demonstrate the precise nature of the relationship between variability of focal firms, 
variability of their competitors and performance.  
                                                 
18 We have around 40 panels and each has average 10 years time periods, in which case FGLS estimator is better. 
19 GLS estimator only deals with basic heteroskekasticity problem that is relevant to panel data per se, i.e. assuming 
each firm has different value of mean, but same value of variance, although such a variance is not constant over 
time. 
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5.0  RESULTS  
Table 1 presents the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics. With the exception of 
variability of M&A and alliance rate and its square term there are no extremely high correlations.  
We use the centering solution to reduce multicollinearity among variability of M&A and alliance 
rate and its square. For all models testing curvilinear relationships between variability of M&A 
and alliance rate and performance, we subtract the mean from the variability variable value 
before creating the product terms. The average VIF is 2.84 (Max: 8.23, Min: 1.04), which is 
lower than the threshold level 10 for the presence of multicolinearity (Chatterjee, Hadi, & Price, 
2000). The results of Hypotheses 1 and 3 are presented in Table 2.  
***Insert TABLE 1, 2 about here*** 
Hypothesis 1: Does variability have an Inverted U-shape Relationship with 
Performance? 
We find support for hypothesis 1. Model 1 is the base model.  The variability variable is 
in model 2 and its coefficient is not statistically significant. However, when we put both 
variability of M&A and alliance rate and its square term in model 3, the coefficient for 
variability is positive and the coefficient for the square term is negative. Both coefficients are 
statistically significant (βr = 0.097; ρ <0.001; βrs = -0.011; ρ <0.05). Figure 3 demonstrates the 
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inverted U-Shape relationship20 21. In general, the variability of M&A and alliance rate that is 
characterized by a mixed of regularity and irregularity achieves the highest level of performance. 
Neither a predictable or consistent variability of M&A and alliance rate nor an unpredictable or 
inconsistent variability of M&A and alliance rate generates superior performance. 
***Insert Figure 3 about here*** 
While our theory is based on a curvilinear relationship between the variability of bundled 
M&As and alliances and performance, these initiatives can be viewed from an unbundled 
perspective. We, therefore, conducted supplemental analysis of variability of M&A and alliances 
separately in model 4 and 5.  
Results in Table 2 and Figure 3 shows the curvilinear relationship between variability and 
performance is largely driven by M&A rather than alliances (In model 5: β ac= 0.112, p < 0.001, 
β acs = -0.010, p < 0.01). We discuss the implication of this finding below.  
Hypothesis 2: If firms synchronize rhythms of their strategic actions with their 
competitors, will such an external synchronization increase performance?  
We argued that when firms synchronize their rhythms with competitors, an external 
entrainment effect will enhance performance through uncertainty reduction and legitimacy 
enhancement. To test this hypothesis we use cross-level polynomial regression. We regress firm 
                                                 
20 From Table 2, model 3, we obtain the following form of the model:  
Tobin’s Q t+1 = EXP (1.679+0.002*# of acquisition+o.021*# of alliances-0.208*asset (log)-0.055 R&D-0.286*roa-
0.066*industry dummy+0.033*stage+0.036*growth+0.002*leverage-0.055*product characteristics+0*stock market 
index+0.097*variability-0.011*variability^2). When calculating, we substitute the mean value for all variables into this 
expression except for variable variability and its square term. 
 
21  When plotting the data, we use one standard deviation below and above the mean, which represents 95% of the sample 
[-1.682, 4.982]. However, the lower end of variable rhythm in our dataset is zero. We, therefore, use zero score instead of 
one standard deviation below the mean.      
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performance on the set of control variables and the five fit-related variables (Focal firm’s 
variability, competitors’ variability, focal firm’s variability *competitors’ variability, focal firm’s 
variability squared, competitors’ variability square). As in hypothesis 1, we examine the 
variability of both the bundled (Model 15) and unbundled M&A and alliance initiatives (Model 
16 and Model 17. Table 3 reports the fixed effects estimates of the fit parameters. The slope and 
curvature along the lines of fit (R = C) and misfit (R = - C) were calculated using equations 
specified in Edwards and Parry (1993) and annotated in Table 3. Statistical significance of these 
slopes and curvatures was essentially determined by testing their linear combinations within SAS 
using CONTRAST statements. 
To facilitate interpretation, we draw on response surface methodology (Khuri & Cornel, 
1996), which permits precise description and evaluation of three dimensional surfaces 
corresponding to polynomial regression equations (Edwards & Parry, 1993, p 1578). In the graph 
in Figure 4 and 5 the fit line runs across the floor of the graph from front to back, and the misfit 
line runs across the floor of the graph from left to right.  
***Insert Figure 4 and 5 about here*** 
Our hypothesis predicted that performance would be highest along the line of fit and 
lowest when focal firm’s variability and competitors’ variability differ. Results in table 3 reveal 
that the overall bundle of strategic initiatives does not show congruent effect, i.e. performance 
was not highest along the line of fit between firms’ variability of bundled M&A and alliance and 
that of competitors (This was indicated by the insignificant coefficient of curvature along the 
misfit line in model 15). However, when we examine the unbundled M&A and alliance 
separately, we find congruent effect for alliance, but not for M&A. In model 16 (alliance), the 
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surface along the line of fit (R = C), had a downward curvature (β Curvature = -0.184, p < 0.01) and 
its slope at the point R = 0, C = 0 did not differ from zero (β Slope = 0.081). This suggests that 
performance increased as R and C both increased and leveled off as R and C reach their 
maximum levels. This is an interesting result since we do not find a curvilinear relationship 
between focal firm’s variability of alliance and performance in hypothesis 1. However, the result 
indicates that such a curvilinear relationship can be found along the fit line. Along the misfit line, 
the surface was curved downward (βcurvature = -0.242, p < 0.05) and essentially flat at the point of 
fit (based on the insignificant slope coefficient along the R=-C line). Taken together, these results 
provide evidence for the hypothesized congruence effect for alliance. 
In model 17 (M&A), we found similar results along the fit line (R=C) for variability of 
acquisitions. The surface along the line of fit has a significant downward curvature, such that 
performance increased as focal firm’s variability of acquisition and competitors’ variability of 
acquisitions both increase and leveled off as they both reached their maximum levels. However, 
along the misfit line (R=-C), the curvature of the surface does not significantly differ from zero, 
indicating the surface was not downward. The coefficient of slope along the misfit line is also 
insignificant. These results fail to provide support for the congruent effect for variability of 
acquisitions.  
Taken together, hypothesis 2 is partially supported. We find support for external 
synchronization of alliances but not for acquisitions. This shed some interesting light on the 
boundary condition of the entrainment model, which we will discuss below.  
Hypothesis 3: If firms synchronize rhythms of M&A and rhythms of alliances 
internally, will such an internal synchronization increase performance?  
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Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive relationship between internal synchronization and 
performance. We argued that synchronization of M&As and alliances can achieve higher 
performance through effective resource allocation, knowledge cross-fertilization and increases 
the complexity of strategic processes, which makes competitor imitation more difficult. Both 
models 6 and 7 support our hypothesis. In model 6, the coefficient of internal synchronization is 
negative and significant (p<0.05), suggesting the smaller the difference between the variability of 
M&A and the rhythm of alliance, the better the performance.  
We replace the Tobin’s q with ROA and rerun the analysis. Consistent with our 
expectation, none of the coefficients are significant at 0.01 level.  
Most of our control variables show predicted relations with performance.  In most 
models, asset growth shows a positive and significant association with Tobin’s Q but not ROA. 
Assets per se are negatively related to Tobin’s Q, suggesting that investors tend to discount large 
firms due to their inefficiency. However, assets are positively associated with ROA, indicating 
that assets may be a beneficial factor for short-term profit but hurt performance in the long run. 
This conclusion can be further inferred from the fact that profitability is negatively related with 
Tobin’s Q, suggesting that investors do not equate short term profitability with long term 
performance. R&D intensity shows negative relationship with both Tobin’s Q and ROA, 
suggesting investing in internal R&D will not only generate expense that lower short term 
performance, but also hurt firms’ long term performance. Investors do not appreciate the fact that 
small firms invest heavily internally since drug development is a risky business and the odds of 
developing a successful or blockbuster drug is very low. The relationship between stages of firm 
development and performance is not significant probably because most of the sample firms are 
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young and the distinction of developmental stages among them is not very precise. Industry 
effects did not impact our findings. Both leverage and product characteristics do not impact 
performance. Our sample of young firms may not have the capability to profit from financial 
leverage. Product characteristic (branded versus generic) has no impact on Tobin’s Q because 
investors perceive these two product categories as equally promising in the future. Our results 
also indicate that neither alliance experience (the number of alliance) nor acquisition experience 
(the number of acquisition) have significant effects on performance measured by Tobin’s Q and 
ROA. Finally, overall stock market has positive and significant impact on performance.  
Finally, our second measure of variability—the instability measure proposed by Dess and 
Beard (1984) generates very similar results suggesting that our temporal constructs are quite 
reliable. In addition to using kurtosis as a fourth order measure, we also use standard deviation as 
a second order (Laamanen & Leil, 2008) and skewness as a third order functions to measure 
variability. Our results did not change significantly based on these different measurements. The 
correlation between kurtosis and skewness measures are very high and statistically significant at 
0.05 level (bundled M&A and alliance: 0.90, acquisition: 0.95, alliance: 0.91), while the 
correlation between kurtosis and standard deviation is not very high (bundle: 0.134, acquisition: 
0.205, alliance: 0.365). Such a triangulation measurement indicates that our results are quite 
robust and reliable since replication of established findings through different measurements can 
be seen as one way of eliminating bias and enable us to ensure that what we have identified as 
‘cause’ actually impacts upon ‘effect’( Johnson & Duberley, 2000). Only the results of the 
kurtosis measure are reported.   
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6.0  DISCUSSION 
We examine and advance the temporal view of M&As and alliances in by adopting the 
social entrainment model with an emphasis on variability and synchronization.  Theoretically, we 
explore the temporal rationales underlying the variability, synchronization, and entrainment 
performance effects for M&A and alliance initiatives.  Empirically we found that the variability 
of corporate M&A and alliance activities have a non-linear relationship with performance. 
Equally important is the finding that internal synchronization enhances firm performance while 
external synchronization demonstrates a more complex picture.  
Our study contributes to the literature along several dimensions. We extend the social 
entrainment model to the field of strategy research which requires us to view corporate strategy, 
particularly M&As and alliances from a temporal perspective. Complementing the perspectives 
that stress the role of target or partners characteristics, learning and post M&A integration 
processes, an entrainment view is concerned with when and how these actions should proceed 
over time. Entrainment suggests that variability and synchronizations have a significant impact 
on the nature and outcome of organization’s competitive advantages.  
Viewing M&As and alliances as mutually entrained and synchronized allows researchers 
to shed new light on the historical debate between adaptation and strategic choice. While it is 
important to note that an entrainment model embraces both the reactive and proactive sides of 
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competitive actions, what is missing from the debate is the notion that these actions also take 
place in a temporal order (Ancona & Chong, 1996). Traditional open-system approach 
(Thompson, 1967) that emphasize the interface between organizations and their environment 
falls short of developing a theoretical foundation that can reveal the temporal pattern of these 
actions ranging from high variability to low variability along the time spectrum.  
Vermeulen and Barkema (2002) found a negative moderating role of variability in the 
context of foreign expansion. We complement their research by studying a direct relationship 
between variability and performance. Although an extreme irregular path may overstretch firm’s 
absorptive capacity as they argued, our reported curvilinear relationship suggests that regularity 
may harm organization performance as much as irregularity. This happens when a regular 
variability creates strong inertia and the isolating mechanisms of a firm can be better understood 
by competitors. Our results further suggested that the curvilinear relationship between variability 
of M&A and alliance rate and performance is largely driven by M&A rather than alliances. 
Although further theoretical development is needed to theoretical differentiate these two 
different, yet related corporate strategies, we provide some possible explanations based on our 
best knowledge. This could be a result of different characteristics of M&As and alliance, i.e. 
resource commitment, information transparency, and asset digestibility (Hennart & Reddy, 
1997).  For instance, for specialty pharmaceutical firms to acquire another pharmaceutical firm 
for a specific resource, it is usually difficulty to separate that critical resource from other 
unwanted resource. Therefore, a temporal acquisition strategy that is characterized by variability 
of acquisition rate might be very susceptible to digestibility nature of the resource. Follow-up 
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study will extend this line of research and provide more systematic theoretical and empirical 
examination.  
Within the context of our sample, our finding for the performance implications of 
synchronization also questions the boundary condition of the social entrainment model proposed 
by McGrath and Kelly (1986) and enriched by Ancona and Chong (1996). While they pinpointed 
the importance of synchronization of variability both internally and externally, little is known 
about the impact of each type of synchronization. Our finding suggests that, for small, young and 
specialty pharmaceutical firms, matching their internal processes and their alliances with their 
competitors creates more of an impact on performance than matching the variability of their 
competitors’ acquisitions. This finding generates more discussion than affirmation and is a 
fruitful direction for future research.  
We further opened the window for strategic scholars to think about creating competitive 
advantage: to regulate the variability and synchronization of variability when conducting 
strategic actions. An important managerial implication is that top managers should explicitly 
learn how to leverage the timing of strategic activities. To this end, the important issue lies far 
beyond how fast or quickly firms should conduct M&A and alliances, but rather in when, how 
and under which condition should firm accelerate or slow down the processes. Speeding up or 
slowing down certain processes at the wrong time may result in mismatches of synchrony among 
important internal or external processes. Meanwhile, our analysis also suggests that firms’ 
specific experience in acquisition or alliance may not be a good predictor of their performance. 
This is an interesting finding since prior studies found that acquisition experience has a positive 
(Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994) or curvilinear relationship with performance (Haleblian, & 
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Finkelstein, 1999). The acquisition or alliance experience, for our sample firms, is not as 
important as the temporal structure of these experiences, i.e. the variability of acquisitions or 
alliances change rate. Given different samples and industry settings used in our study, we suggest 
take caution when generalizing our findings. However, we believe understanding the variability 
and synchronization of acquisition and alliance will enhance and clarify our understanding of the 
relationship between experience and performance debate.  
Our analysis of external synchronization indicates that synchronization of alliance but not 
M&A with external competitors will increase performance significantly. Even when a focal 
firm’s variability of M&A is exceeded by competitors, performance is not negatively affected. 
Our finding is more consistent with the traditional institutional arguments that emphasize the 
negative aspect of mimetic M&A behaviors in the absence of an adequate concern for economic 
rationality.  An implication is that for small and medium-sized specialty drug firms, it is 
important for them to develop and maintain their distinctive variability pattern rather than to 
follow a trendy variability irrationally produced by a group of firms in the market. However, we 
do find that performance increase when firms follow their competitors’ variability of alliance. 
One possible explanation is that internal routines that deal with multiple alliances are more 
fungible and transferable than those that deal with acquisitions. Acquisition routines may be very 
unique and specific to a particular acquisition, therefore is much more difficult to generate. 
These findings present a venue to extend interesting but underdeveloped research on strategic 
temporality. 
The “matching as fit” embedded in the entrainment hypothesis can serve as a benchmark 
for synchronization behaviors against which actual instances of synchronization behaviors can be 
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evaluated. The role of benchmark is particularly important in testing a theory (Dubin, 1978; 
Popper 1968). While the benchmark hypothesis implies an efficiency rationale regarding firm’s 
M&A and alliance behaviors, an interesting question that our current study cannot answer, but 
merits further investigation is why firms do not correct their seemingly misleading asynchrony 
among multiple processes. We argue that there could be a variety of reasons to cause such 
deviant behavior. For instance, firms may realize the importance of developing synchronization 
among multiple processes, however, the lack of coordination skills may limit their capability to 
accomplish the goal. This issue is particularly salient when M&A and alliance managers 
insufficiently consider their dynamic interplay and are unable to see how their own actions can 
affect and be affected by those of others whom they interact (Zajac & Bazerman, 1991). Such 
suboptimal behavior could also result from the different mindsets of M&A and alliance 
managers. The clash or conflict between their visions can delay the process of effective 
adjustment to the efficiency level of synchronization.  
We make an important assumption regarding managers’ motivation and ability to plan 
M&A and alliance initiative consistent with our entrainment model. This assumption is plausible 
under two conditions: 1) firms’ overall growth strategies are largely driven by M&A and 
alliances activities, 2) firms do not have sufficient capabilities to develop drug products and 
relevant technologies internally.  These two important conditions are met in our sample firms. 
Future research can test our argument to large firm and other industry contexts, where the two 
conditions may not hold. 
Indeed, there are few strategy studies that examine the performance implication of 
temporal strategy of M&A and alliance. This stream of research is still in the process of 
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formation. We suggest that drawing normative implication from our study needs to be done with 
caution. For this reason, our research question is an interesting “academic question” that that 
should be subject to further theoretical and empirical examination.  purpose of our study is,  
therefore, to stimulate further thoughts and open a new venue for academic scholars and 
practitioners to think about M&A and alliance from a temporal perspective. Future research that 
aims to strengthen normative implication of this stream of research by adopting an approach that 
combine quantitative and qualitative methods will be a very challenging, yet very rewarding 
endeavor.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
 
    Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Tobin's Q 4.446 5.281 1.000            
2 Variability of Bundled M&A and Alliance 1.654 1.699 -0.049 1.000        
      
   
   
   
   
   
         
3 Variability of M&A 1.386 2.161 -0.106* 0.623* 1.000          
4 Variability of Alliance 1.216 1.486 -0.023 0.579* 0.152* 1.000            
5 Internal Synchronization 1.431 1.970 -0.010 0.753* 0.679* 0.359* 1.000           
6 
Competitors' Variability of Bundled M&A and 
Alliance 1.651 0.774 -0.131* 0.459* 0.334* 0.340* 0.345* 1.000          
7 Competitors' Variability of M&A 1.382 0.951 -0.174* 0.345* 0.445* 0.178* 0.279* 0.752* 1.000         
8 Competitors' Variability of Alliance 1.213 0.658 -0.098* 0.350* 0.177* 0.446* 0.185* 0.763* 0.398* 1.000           
9 Number of Acquisitions 2.854 5.044 -0.146* 0.128* 0.236* 0.169* -0.064 0.261* 0.372* 0.267* 1.000       
10 Number of Alliances 1.446 1.843 0.012 0.177* 0.119* 0.397* 0.082 0.199* 0.228* 0.177* 0.491* 1.000         
11 Asset 572.121 1005.372 -0.155* 0.139* 0.219* 0.108* -0.014 0.214* 0.398* 0.202* 0.719* 0.470* 1.000        
12 R&D intensity 1.121 2.474 0.116* -0.081 -0.125* -0.071 -0.025 -0.145* -0.220* -0.162* -0.174* -0.092 -0.196* 1.000       
13 Profitability -0.114 0.344 -0.414* 0.104* 0.196* 0.072 0.021 0.100* 0.274* 0.086 0.199* 0.046 0.227* -0.470* 1.000      
14 Industry 0.900 0.301 -0.081 0.105* 0.117* 0.091 0.063 0.033 0.033 0.109* 0.147* 0.185* 0.119* 0.020 0.068 1.000     
15 Stage 1.754 0.764 -0.250* 0.056 0.118* 0.136* -0.100* 0.129* 0.269* 0.314* 0.368* 0.063 0.289* -0.391* 0.482* 0.258* 1.000    
16 Growth 0.441 1.117 0.058 0.116* 0.127* -0.052 0.102* -0.008 0.054 -0.081 -0.053 -0.066 -0.005 -0.008 0.117* -0.071 -0.088 1.000   
17 Leverage 0.303 6.401 -0.043 0.016 -0.013 0.011 0.013 -0.033 -0.008 0.008 0.004 0.036 0.031 -0.008 0.065 -0.007 0.011 0.132* 1.000  
18 Branded 0.652 0.477 0.102* 0.022 -0.062 -0.032 0.103* -0.048 -0.129* -0.154* -0.201* 0.033 -0.107* 0.273* -0.319* -0.127* -0.631* 0.065 -0.015 1.000 
19 Stock Market 6818.538 3098.063 0.012 0.262* 0.292* 0.132* 0.246* 0.570* 0.657* 0.296* 0.269* 0.251* 0.329* -0.060 0.052 -0.101* -0.091 0.081 0.003 0.078 
Notes:  * p<0.05 
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Table 2. Feasible Generalized Least Square Regression 
 Tobin's Qt+1 (Log) ROAt+1 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Main Effect                
Variability (Bundle of M&A and alliance)  0.016 0.097**       0.001 0.008     
Variability Square (Bundle of M&A and 
alliance)   -0.011*        -0  .001     
Variability of M&A    0.024 0.112***  0.023a     0.006 0.015
a  0.009a 
Variability of Alliance     -0.003 -0.006  -0.008     -0.004 -0.001  -0.003 
Variability of M&A Square     -0.010**        -0  .001   
Variability of Alliance Square     0.001        -0.001   
Internal Synchronization between M&A 
and alliance      -0.  068 062* -0.  *       -0.012 -0.017 
Control Variables                
Intercept 1.209** 1.264** 1.679*** 1.289** 1.534*** 1.722*** 1.705*** -0.098 -0.094 -0.072 -0.089 -0.065 -0.091 -0.116 
Total Number of Acquisitions 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
Total Number of Alliances 0.035 0.032 0.021 0.039 0.044a 0.013 0.022 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009a -0.009 
Asset (log) -0.234*** -0.231*** -0.208** -0.238*** -0.267*** -0.223*** -0.240*** 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.009 0.013 
R&D intensity -0.053a -0.051a -0.055** -0.052a -0.057* -0.059a -0.061a -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.049*** 
Profitability  -0.151 -0.159 -0.286* -0.152 -0.173a 0.006 0.009 0.490*** 0.491*** 0.492*** 0.489*** 0.496*** 0.472*** 0.406*** 
Industry Dummy 0.033 0.020 -0.066 0.004 -0.064 0.035 0.015 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.039 0.034 
Stage 0.098 0.089 0.033 0.101 0.129 0.030 0.057 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.025a 0.033* 0.042* 
Asset Growth 0.026* 0.026* 0.036** 0.025* 0.032** 0.013 0.016 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002a -0.002a -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Branded 0.118 0.111 0.055 0.110 0.077 0.032 0.015 -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.009 -0.012 
Stock market 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000**         
Year Dummy (1986-2003)  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Num 373 373 373 373 373 373 373 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 
Wald Chi2 177.17*** 185.21*** 196.87*** 184.35*** 199.62*** 169.87*** 167.47*** 339.61*** 339.84*** 339.87*** 343.14*** 345.22*** 336.12*** 335.72*** 
Log Likelihood -345.29 -342.59 -338.74 -342.88 -337.84 -203.64 -204.37 -10.16 -10.09 -10.08 -9.23 -8.69 -10.89 -11.12 
Notes:  a p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 3. Cross-level Polynomial Regression Results of Firm’s Performance 
(Tobin’s Q) on Firm’s Variability and Competitors’ Variability 
  Bundle M&A and Alliance Unbundled M&A and Alliance 
Fixed Effect Coefficients Model 15 Model 16 (Alliance) Model 17(M&A) 
Controls     
Intercept 1.810*** 2.149*** 2.146*** 
  (0.219) (0.252) (0.246) 
Total Number of Acquisitions 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
Total Number of Alliances 0.043a 0.034 0.035 
  (0.023) (0.028) (0.027) 
Asset -0.194*** -0.214*** -0.231*** 
  (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) 
R&D intensity -0.021 -0.023 -0.019 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Profitability -0.393*** -0.439** -0.453*** 
  (0.124) (0.126) (0.125) 
Asset growth 0.036 0.035 0.039 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Leverage 0.002 0.004 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Branded -0.035 0.004 0.034 
  (0.078) (0.079) (0.081) 
Industry Dummy -0.022 -0.022 -0.047 
  (0.115) (0.117) (0.116) 
Stock market 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Variability of acquisition--R  0.076*  
   (0.036)  
Variability of acquisition (squared)  -0.006  
   (0.004)  
Variability of competitors' acquisition--E  0.079  
   (0.062)  
Variability of alliance--R    0.104* 
     (0.040) 
Variability of alliance (squared)    -0.014* 
     (0.007) 
Variability of competitors' alliance--E    -0.053 
     (0.073) 
Fit variables      
R 0.131*** 0.099* 0.068a 
E -0.124 -0.018 0.095 
R2 -0.002 -0.018 -0.005 
R*E -0.068* 0.029 0.003 
E2 -0.058 -0.195* -0.105 
Response surface features     
R=E fit line     
Slope (R+E) 0.007 0.081 0.163a 
Curvature (R2+R*E+E2) -0.128** -0.184** -0.107 
R=-E misfit line     
Slope (R-E) 0.255** 0.117 -0.027 
Curvature (R2  - R*E+E2) 0.008 -0.242* -0.113 
Total variance explained b 0.308* 0.290* 0.301* 
Notes:  a p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001, b Total variance explained= 1- (residual variance of full model / 
residual variance of null model), significance was determined by Chi Square difference across models
  
 
Figure 1. Difference between Low Variability and High Variability of M&A and 
Alliance Rate 
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Average variability of acquisition in the sample is 1.59 and the standard 
deviation is 2.16. The variability above in 2000 is zero, well below the average 
 
(b) High Variability 
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Average variability of acquisition in the sample is 1.59 and the standard 
deviation is 2.16. The variability above in 2000 is 5.03, well above the average (about 1.5 
times of standard deviation 
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Figure 2.  Synchronization of M&As and Alliances 
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The number of acquisitions is synchronized with the number of alliances in a 
way that increase (decrease) in acquisitions is accompanied by increase (decrease) in 
alliances. 
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Figure 3.  Hypothesis 1: The Inverted Relationship between Variability of 
Strategic Initiatives and Performance 
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Figure 4. Surface Graph of Fit between Firm’s Variability of Alliances and 
Competitors’ Variability of Alliance Predicting Firm’s Performance 
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Figure 5. Surface Graph of Fit between Firm’s Variability of Acquisitions and 
Competitors’ Variability of Acquisitions Predicting Firm’s Performance 
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APPENDIX A 
[TIME IN STRATEGY RESEARCH] 
The temporal dimension of strategy is embedded in a wide range of phenomena, 
including but not limited to first mover advantages (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), the 
resource based view (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 
1997), decision-making under uncertainty ( Eisenhardt, 1989), change management (Huy, 
2001), and the real options perspective (Kogut, 1991).  For instance, Barney (1991) argued 
that resources that are developed and accumulated over time are less likely to be imitated by 
competitors—a path dependent notion that is clearly relevant to time. Similarly, based on the 
law of diminishing returns, Dierickx and Cool suggested that firms cannot possibly 
accumulate the same stock of knowledge in one year as in two, even if all other inputs are 
doubled.  In the field of real options, scholars stress the value of a “wait and see,” approach 
implying that time can be am important asset in generating firms’ strategic flexibility (Tong 
& Reuer, 2007).  While these research streams have provided significant practice and process 
insights, the role of time in these studies has not been explicitly spelled out and therefore time 
as a theoretical concept and as an object of empirical inquiry remains mostly peripheral 
(Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence & Tushman, 2001), the lack of which constrains strategy 
 58 
scholars’ enhanced understanding and application of a temporal lens in strategy research.  In 
particular, there are three points in the temporal perspective that deserve strategy scholars’ 
attention.  
First, for time to be an important direct causal variable in theories of firm strategy 
(Mosakowski & Earley, 2000), and therefore to be subject to managerial design and 
manipulation, time as a strategic construct should take center stage as a construct standing on 
its own and receiving direct theoretical and empirical inquiry (Ancona et al., 2001).  The 
temporal lens, as Ancona et al. (2001) suggested, should offer its own set of constructs, 
variables, relationships, laws of interaction, and its own set of parameters to guide managerial 
action and create new sources of competitive advantage. This has garnered some interest in 
strategy research, but has not been fully recognized and integrated into prior strategy studies.  
This inattention can be understood from two separate yet interrelated issues—one is the 
conceptualization of time and the other is the associated model or framework that 
incorporates time as a strategic variable.  
Prior strategy studies usually consider time as part of the general background of a 
problem rather than as an important issue in its own right (Albert, 1995).  Therefore, the 
conceptualization of time has become a less important issue and has seldom been identified 
and clarified.  For instance, in studies that have frequently adopted concepts such as first 
mover advantages, timing, uncertainty, or responsiveness, the notion and concept of time 
remains implicit, rather than explicit (Bulter, 1995: 925) and the assumptions of time are also 
seldom or never discussed in studying these strategy dynamics (Mosakowski & Earley, 
2000). The conceptualization of time is an important issue because it is time per se that is a 
critical input in the process of creating competitive advantage.  Lack of such 
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conceptualization will lead strategy scholars to search for other proxy factors of time such as 
labor, learning, and trust, to mention a few.  While we do not deny the importance of these 
proxies as separate constructs, focus on these constructs alone will, in our view, overshadow 
the value of a direct examination of temporal constructs.  Even Dierickx and Cool (1989) 
recognized that time itself—not its proxy—may be an important input into asset creation 
processes.  A related consequence is the absence of solid and coherent theoretical 
frameworks, models or foundations that address the question of how to think about time in 
strategic management research.  As such, although we can see a growing interest in 
incorporating a temporal lens as an additional component of other traditional lenses in 
strategy research, we do not see the emergence of corresponding new paradigms, frameworks 
or models that can incorporate a temporal lens, giving time   center stage to stand on its own 
and to integrate time constructs with other relevant  strategy-related variables.  
Our temporal approach to examining strategy phenomena resonates with Ancona et 
al.’s (2000) call for a direct focus on time as a conceptual and empirical construct rather than 
as a proxy for other constructs.  For instance, we focus on rhythm as an important temporal 
construct that brings time onto center stage.  We define rhythm as the variability of M&A and 
alliance rate and measure it by kurtosis of the first derivative of the number of M&As and 
alliances over time.  This conceptualization and operationalization of rhythm  suggest that 
rhythm is not a proxy measure for other constructs, but is rather a temporal construct that is 
subjective to managerial design and manipulation against time.  
The temporal approach we adopted also has an integrated theoretical framework that 
can link different temporal constructs cohesively.  For instance, our entrainment framework 
contains several temporal constructs such as rhythm, internal synchronization and external 
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synchronization that are linked together.  We argue that firms’ rhythm of M&A and alliance 
formation will have a profound effect on performance.  Meanwhile, different units within an 
organization (such as M&A and alliance initiatives) maintain different rhythms, and yet they 
can be integrated and oscillate in sympathy with each other (internal synchronization), which 
will also impact performance.  Furthermore, firms can also match their rhythms with 
competitors (external synchronization), which will further impact performance.  
Our temporal approach, therefore, incorporates several time-related constructs within 
an integrated theoretical framework that demonstrates significant theoretical complexity. 
Such complexity reflects our views of organizations as nonlinear and dynamic systems, 
within which different strategic actions struggle the inherent tension between predictability 
and unpredictability, are irreversible and highly susceptible to initial conditions (Ofordi-
Dankwa & Julian, 2001). 
Second, strategy scholars have agreed that strategy is emergent, dynamic, logically 
incremental, path dependent and express patterns of interaction overtime (Mintzberg, 1990).  
This clearly demonstrates that we should examine the relevant issue in strategy from a “past-
present-future” time perspective.  However,  current literature, particularly empirical studies 
in strategy tends to focus on either the “past-future” link or the “present-future” connection 
(Ofordi-Dankwa & Julian, 2001).  For instance, the resource-based view has emphasized how 
resources accumulated in the path-dependent manner (past) influences sustainability of 
economic rents and competitive advantage (future) without incorporate a present time 
orientation (Mosakowski, 1998).  The present-future time linkage has been reflected in real 
options theory, hyper-competition (D’Aveni, 1994), strategic decision making in high-
velocity environments (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998), and the traditional SWOT analysis 
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(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994).  For example, scholars using the real options perspective suggest 
how current decisions regarding allying with a foreign partner can generate strategic 
flexibility in the future when uncertainty becomes more clarified.  
The “past-present-future” time perspective posits that past strategic actions have 
profound impact on present results as well as future outcomes.  Similarly, future decisions are 
collections of reflections of not only present behaviors, but also a series of past actions.  In 
our study, we posit that firms’ future performance can be predicted by a series of past and 
present M&A and alliance initiatives. The present rhythm of these strategic initiatives is 
somewhat path dependent, irreversible and bounded by initial conditions (Ofordi-Dankwa & 
Julian, 2001).   
Third, previous strategy research that implicitly embodies the temporal view tends to 
examine a single strategic action, activity or event along the time dimension, with few 
exceptions (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999).  For instance, the decision making literature 
mainly focuses on the speed of making a single strategic decision (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Also, 
change management examines the process of change of a single phenomenon or event, such 
as a technological breakthrough.  In M&A research, scholars are interested in examining how 
speed of post-integration of a single merger will affect the performance of the acquirer. Such 
a singular view of strategy is quite restricting given the fact that strategy is consistently 
defined and perceived as a pattern emerged from a series of actions and decisions (Mintzberg 
& Water, 1985).  A repeated and multiple action perspective of strategy, in our view, enlarges 
the horizon of time, thus increasing the value of incorporating the temporal view in strategy 
research and therefore enhancing the possibility to detect patterns in strategic decisions over 
time.  
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Our current study is consistent with the multiple action view of strategy. This has 
been reflected in both our theoretical development and empirical examination.  From a theory 
perspective, our core temporal constructs such as rhythm, and internal and external 
synchronization are conceptualized based on repeated and multiple M&A and alliance 
initiatives.  Our methodology is also consistent with such a multiple action orientation. We 
collect information on a longitudinal base that tracks individual firms’ multiple M&A and 
alliance initiatives over their histories.      
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APPENDIX B 
[TIME IN ALLIANCE AND M&A RESEARCH] 
A temporal view of alliances and M&As has been advanced in some recent research 
streams; however, there is no systematic investigation that explicitly adopts a clear temporal 
perspective based on the criteria developed above.  The studies that implicitly relate time 
with M&As and alliances include, but are not limited to, accelerating or slowing down post-
acquisition integration (Homburg & Bucerius, 2006), preemptive acquisition (Carow, Heron, 
& Saxton, 2004), the relationship between M&A and alliance experience and performance 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) and M&A and alliances as learning tools and races (Hamel, 
1991).  For instance, Inkpen (2001) argued that learning about alliance partners is highly 
associated with effective alliance management.  The key emphasis in this type of learning is 
to create new knowledge and capabilities that are jointly developed by both partners 
(Dussauge, Garrette, & Witchell, 2004), which lead to common benefits (Khanna, Gulati, & 
Nohria, 1998), those that accrue to each partner in an alliance from the collective application 
of the learning that both firms go through as a consequence of being part of the alliance.  In 
another study, Hamel, Doz and Prahalad (1989) proposed the notion of learning from an 
alliance partner, which is different from learning about the partner. Unlike learning about the 
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partner, which stresses the joint utilization of resources, the argument of learning from 
partners shifts alliance partners’ emphasis on cooperation toward competition.  The central 
issues associated with this type of learning are the bargaining power (Inkpen & Beamish, 
1997; Yan, 1998) or dependence argument (Inkpen & Currall, 2004).  In these studies, 
scholars tend to focus on a single alliance rather than multiple alliance initiatives or alliance 
portfolio.  As a result, the key temporal-related concept is duration of an alliance, within 
which learning is unfolded.  Meanwhile, time has neither been conceptualized nor measured 
directly in the framework.  Instead, time has been perceived as a proxy for learning, i.e., the 
longer time passes during an alliance, the better the learning effect. 
In M&A research, one of the most studied topics that are relevant to time is the 
relationship between acquisition experience and performance, though empirical findings 
generate conflicting results.  For instance, building on the learning curve argument, Lubatkin 
(1982) failed to find a positive relationship between acquisition experience and performance. 
Bruton, Oviatt, and White (1994) found that whether firms’ acquisition experience can 
impact their performance depends on their financial condition prior to acquisition.  The 
positive relationship, as they observed, is only clear in a group of distressed firms, defined as 
those who have two consecutive years of declining net income and return on investment prior 
to acquisition.  Recently, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) challenged the implicit 
assumptions in traditional learning research, arguing that an organization’s acquisitions may 
not be similar to each other and therefore past acquisition experience is not readily 
generalized from one acquisition to another.  Research on acquisition experience equals time 
with experience.  Experience increases as time passes by.  In other words, time is viewed as a 
proxy for experience.  This stream of research has centered on multiple acquisitions; 
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however, it does not recognize the nature of interdependence and embeddedness in strategy.  
For instance, firms’ serial acquisitions might well be  affected by their alliance initiatives.  
Several scholars have argued that knowledge gained from alliances might spill over to 
managing acquisitions (Zollo & Reuer, 2001).  Similarly, firms’ acquisition momentum can 
also be influenced by their competitors’ serial acquisition initiatives.  Essentially, our study 
recognized that strategy is a multi-level and multi-process phenomenon that involves 
different activities interacting in a complex and dynamic way.  
Another important topic that is time relevant centers on studying the relationship 
between post-integration process and M&A success.  In this research stream, researchers tend 
to explore different types of fit between the acquirer and target firms (Finkelstein & 
Haleblian, 2002; Harrison & St. John, 1998).  For instance, Larsson & Finkelstein’s (1999) 
analysis revealed that organizational integration was the single most important factor in 
explaining synergy realization, even as the strategic potential of the combination was taken 
into consideration.  Furthermore, Marks and Mirvis (1998) argued that a critical element in 
successful M&As is to build cooperation between acquirer and target companies. Top 
managers, as Marks and Mirvis suggested, should create an appropriate climate or culture to 
understand the mindset of their respective firms.  Other scholars stressed the role of resource 
allocation process between targets and acquirers (Capron, 1999).  Capron and Pistre (2002) 
empirically explored the conditions under which acquirers can earn abnormal returns. They 
found that positive returns are expected only when acquirers transfer their own resources to 
the target rather than vice versa.  This stream of research aims to understand the acquisition 
process from a single deal perspective.  The eventual outcome of acquisitions is either 
successful integration or failure.  The emphasis is on the duration of a single acquisition.  
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These studies, however, do not provide normative implications in terms of whether a 
successful integration or a failed deal will pass on to other acquisitions in the future.  Our 
study took a different approach and assumed all acquisitions to have been integrated with an 
emphasis on temporal distance between different deals rather than on the time span within a 
single deal.   
While these different thrusts offer unique contributions for enhancing our temporal 
understanding of M&A and alliance initiatives, two important temporal issues remain 
underdeveloped.  First,  focus on a single M&A or alliance does not incorporate the nature of 
multiple strategic initiatives and their interplay.  In other words M&A and alliances are not 
approached from a portfolio perspective (Hoffmann, 2007).  Researchers, when describing 
the post integration process, focus on a single acquisition which occurs on the time 
continuum.  A key emphasis is on how long this post integration lasts, from beginning to 
endpoint.  Clearly, the important constructs, though not directly examined, but implicitly 
assumed, are duration, scheduling, endurance, and persistence.  Similarly, the learning 
perspective in alliance research also stresses the alliance as a single entity.   
Second, those scholars that have recognized the interdependent nature of multiple 
M&A and alliances (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) have not addressed their periodicity and 
the fact that multiple initiatives can occur synchronously at the same level of analysis (e.g., 
firm) or across levels of analysis (e.g., firms and their competitive environment).  In other 
words, M&A and alliance initiatives can demonstrate a discernable pattern in the timing of 
their occurrences conditioned by internal or external pacers. Thus, a temporal lens of M&As 
and alliances calls for theoretical development and empirical examination of temporal 
constructs.   
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APPENDIX C 
[INDUSTRY CONTEXT] 
Pharmaceutical industry in general 
We define the pharmaceutical industry as well as its incumbents as those public and 
private organizations involved in the discovery, development, and manufacture of drugs and 
medications. Globally, the three largest drug markets are the United States, Europe and 
Japan.   
Typically, the largest and best-known pharmaceutical firms have integrated value 
chains that consist of all those aforementioned functions.  There are also some smaller and 
usually younger firms that are attempting to develop a narrower range of products.  These 
firms are less likely to be fully integrated.  Among the manufacturers are firms producing 
generic drugs—products that are in many ways equivalent to existing drugs whose patents 
have expired.  Our study mainly deals with those smaller and younger firms that occupy a 
specific market niche as well as generic drug companies.  
The modern era of drug discovery and development originated in the 19th century 
when researchers and scientists began to isolate and purify medicinal compounds and 
developed manufacturing techniques in a mass-production manner.  While many drugs, such 
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as quinine and morphine, were extracted from plant substances, others were discovered and 
synthesized by techniques including combinatorial chemistry and recombinant DNA 
technology.  Since its formation, the pharmaceutical industry has greatly aided medical 
progress, and many new drugs have been discovered, greatly improving the quality of life of 
modern human beings.  During the past several decades, there have been some distinctive 
features that have characterized the global pharmaceutical industry.  
First, the industry maintains rapid growth continuously. Its scale has started to 
maintain fast growth since the middle and late 20th century.  The total amount of output (in 
terms of value) increased from US $21.8 billion in 1970 to US $602 billion in 2005 with an 
annual growth rate of 8.3%, more than double the growth rate of global GDP in the same 
period.  The rapid growth rate was largely due to the fact that the industry was highly 
profitable (well above the average for all manufacturing industries as well as for Fortune 500 
companies), thus attracting more and more entries over the years, and enhancing demand for 
prevention and treatment of many diseases over time.  As a result, the industry has become 
increasingly concentrated over the past decade; the 10 firm concentration ratio increased from 
12 percent in 1987, to around 20 percent in the middle of 1990s, and reached to almost 50 
percent at the beginning of the twenty first century.  
Second, the pharmaceutical industry has a very high rate of investment in R&D, 
with a correspondingly rapid pace of product innovation.  U.S. firms, for example, spent over 
$21 billion and $24 billion in R&D in the United States and abroad in 1998 and 1999, 
respectively.  These investments represent around 12 percent share of total revenue, a share 
that is nearly double that of most other industries, including office equipment, electronics, 
and telecommunications.  In 2000, for the U.S research-based pharmaceutical industry, the 
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R&D/sales ratio was 15.6 percent compared to 10.5 percent for computer software, the next 
highest industry (Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers Association, 2001).  In a similar 
vein, the average R&D cost per new chemical entity (NCE) brought to the market was 
estimated at around $802 million ( DiMasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, 2002).  The high cost and 
significant investment in R&D are largely due to three factors: 1) high return on investment 
in R&D generates strong incentives necessary to conduct R&D.  R&D investment typically 
flows to clinical areas where relatively large markets exist—either large numbers of patients, 
or purchasers willing to pay prices that, in the long run, cover the costs and risks of these 
investments; 2) the process of drug discovery and development is extremely costly.  Human 
clinical trials are required by law in many countries (such as by the FDA in the U.S) to 
establish proof of safety and efficacy.  Typically, it takes around 10 to 15 years for a drug to 
pass through discovery stage (pre-clinical), human clinical stage, regulatory approval stage 
and eventually product launch stage;  3) Failure rates in each stage are extremely high. It is 
estimated that for “each new compound that is approved, roughly five enter human clinical 
trails and 250 enter preclinical testing” (Danzon, Nicholson, & Pereira, 2005:2).  The cost of 
“dry hole”—those that fail, will be included in the total cost of R&D investment, therefore 
driving the total R&D cost significantly higher.  
Third, high rates of innovation also help the pharmaceutical industry establish the 
patent system that aims to protect the large pharmaceutical companies and their drugs’ 
inventors.  However, the patent system also generates controversy among the public.  On the 
one hand, concern over the cost of health care and growing interest in health care reform has 
increased markedly throughout the 1980s.  Consumer advocates pointed out the monopoly 
benefits of patent protection, evidence of oligopolistic behavior, and suggested extensive 
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government intervention to control the profits of pharmaceutical firms.  On the other hand, 
industry spokespeople argued against government interference, suggesting that lower profits 
would decrease innovation.  This is particularly the case in U.S where the patent system is 
well developed and maintained.  It is estimated that patent protection allows the U.S 
pharmaceutical industry to produce nearly half of all patented drugs that were introduced 
globally between 1975 and 1994. 
Patent protection, in addition to its effects on pricing and associated government 
intervention, also has a profound impact on industry evolution. Drug patents usually give 
twenty years of protection. However, they are applied before clinical trails begin, so the 
effective life of patent protection typically lasts twelve to sixteen years on average.  During 
this period, the company who invented the patented drug has exclusive marketing rights.  
Once the patent expires, a drug is much less profitable.  This creates severe problems for 
companies whose revenues are established on a few blockbuster drugs.  Once these patents 
expire, the company’s revenues can diminish within a few months, unless new compounds 
can be fueled through pipeline.  This results largely from the entry of generic drug makers, 
which is a  focus of our study.  Generic drugs are those drugs that contain the same active 
ingredients that their brand name counterparts do and are tested to assure that they are 
therapeutically equivalent, but they may contain different inactive ingredients from those 
found in the brand name medications.  Generic drugs are much cheaper because their 
manufacturers do not incur the cost of drug discovery or of proving the safety  and efficacy of 
the drugs through clinical trails, and instead are able to reverse-engineer known drug 
compounds to allow them to manufacture bioequivalent versions.  It is estimated that the 
generics basically come into the market with prices 15 to 20, maybe 25% less than that of the 
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brand name, which makes them a lot more profitable to market than they used to be 
(Rylander, 2007).  
Fourth, the emergence and development of biotechnology have already  blurred the 
industry boundary between pharmaceuticals and others.  In particular, there is more and more 
convergence between the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, resulting in the bio-
pharmaceutical industry.  The technology that our sample firms focused on is mainly 
biotechnology-related. There are several distinctions between biotechnology and traditional 
pharmaceutical drugs.  First, they differ by the way that they are produced. Traditional 
pharmaceutical drugs are relatively simple molecules that have been found primarily through 
trial and error to treat the symptoms of a disease or illness.  To some extent, the process of 
trial and error is also called random screening that involves lots of serendipity and co-
specialized technologies.  Biotechnology-based drugs use large biological molecules known 
as proteins. The search process is usually more guided and path dependent (Ohba & 
Figueredo, 2007).  Second, the biotechnology-based drugs are typically dosed through a large 
molecule that is injected while traditional pharmaceutical drugs can be administrated through 
a small molecule via a tablet.  Injected bio-based drugs usually have more side effects 
compared with traditional pharmaceutical drugs.  However, biotechnology holds the promise 
of making landmark breakthroughs in new medical therapies to treat cancers, arthritis, bone 
fractures, and cardiovascular disease.  Third, biotechnology-based drugs are usually easier 
and cheaper to manufacture.  For instance, Genentech used a genetically engineered 
bacterium to enable the production of vast quantities of human insulin (widely used for the 
treatment of diabetes) at low cost. Previously, insulin was extracted from animals such as 
pigs and sheep, a process which was often expensive and caused unwanted side effects (e.g., 
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allergic reactions).  Lastly, regarding the process of pre-clinical and human clinical trails, 
biotechnology products have a higher chance of making it all the way through to approval.  
This is because protein peptide drugs (biotechnology) are essentially biologically-derived 
from replacements of missing “pieces” in people with given diseases.  They are injected into 
people  and are not  seen as being broken down and gotten rid of by the body (Green, 2007).  
Fifth, during the past decade, the demand of the market has also changed 
significantly largely due to the changing attitude of managed care organizations (such as 
health care insurance providers) and the government.  A variety of reimbursement policies 
has been established regarding the price of existing branded drugs and generics which may 
adversely affect the development and launch of new branded drugs.  Take the U.S., for 
example: historically, it has less government restriction on the pricing regime.  However, the 
pharmaceutical companies face increasing pressure from the federal, state and local 
governments to propose the re-importation of cheaper drugs from adjacent countries such as 
Canada and Mexico.  Meanwhile, powerful managed care organizations design certain 
financial incentives to encourage patients (doctors as well) to use generic or existing branded 
drugs rather than new branded drugs unless these new ones are measurably better than the 
alternatives (Kohl, Partner, Hogan & Hartson, 2006). 
 
Specialty Pharmaceutical Industry 
We define specialty pharmaceuticals as those firms that mainly deal with expensive 
medications that treat rare, chronic diseases inflicting a small proportion of the population 
(Mass, 2005).  Those special diseases include but are not limited to Heophilia, Hepatitis C, 
Ocology, HIV/AIDs and transplants, just to mention a few.  A good example is Allergan.  To 
 73 
quote Allergan’s top executive: “We are a specialty company.  That’s what we been. That’s 
how we have been able to compete really effectively. We are an ophthalmology company for 
example when we compete in ophthalmology very effectively.  We are the largest company 
in the world in ophthalmology.  We are a neurology company with botox in a very specific 
area and we are a dermatology company and now plastic surgery company in the aesthetics 
business.  So we have a good core capability to function very well in what we call a 
specialized marketplace” (Pal, 2007).  
The specialty pharmaceutical market is a rapidly growing market.  In 2003, the total 
market size was around U.S $ 32.3, about 15% of total pharmaceutical industry (a further 
breakdown of specialty market can be found in Figure 6).  Meanwhile, Medco’s 2004 drug 
trend report also indicated that specialty drug spending grew 26.6% in 2003, a much faster 
pace than the 10.2% average increase in drug spending in general.  In 2005, the global market 
size for specialty pharmaceutical products grew to US $ 75 billion (Mergers & Acquisitions 
Report, 2006) with an annual increase of around 50% in just two years.  The growth of 
specialty drug is particularly strong in the U.S.  It is estimated, by 2010, that specialty-drug 
spending in the U.S. could reach $99 billion by 2010, nearly double the $54 billion spent in 
2006 (Wall Street Journal, 2008). 
***Insert Figure 6 about here*** 
The emergence of the specialty pharmaceutical industry is largely due to four 
possible reasons. First, there exists a niche market where big pharmaceutical firms do not 
demonstrate much interest due to its small market size.  Small markets indicate that big 
pharmaceutical firms cannot effectively leverage their economies of scale, particularly in 
manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of these special drugs.  For instance, in the United 
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State or even globally, most of the large pharmaceutical companies really do not want to 
develop a product that does not have sales potential of at least 500 million dollars a year. 
There’s a whole economic threshold there at which only small players would have any 
interest in participating because large players don’t want to deal with it.  Big companies may 
also simply neglect these markets for special drugs because of the tendency of “blind spots”, 
i.e. they focus too much on their core business and fail to see the opportunities that are 
emerging outside of these cores.  For instance, as one of the pharmaceutical top executives 
mentioned, “I think the movement to niche markets, where the large companies just flatly 
ignored, blow some structure we’re not gonna deal with that, so the small companies got all 
sorts of help for the small medium sized entrepreneurship. I think there is also, due to the 
consolidation and the mergers or maybe even a bit of boredom into sort of stagnant 
pharmaceutical world for so many years, people have decided to branch out and try 
something new to take care of knowledge and expertise to try to create something different, 
in a different model because they didn’t like the way the business was being done, or they 
had a different vision” (Rylander, 2007). 
Second, the change of patient trend also contributes to the burgeoning market of 
specialty pharmaceuticals.  In particular, patients prefer chronic therapy over acute therapy 
over time.  Chronic therapy typically takes more time to cure and costs more; however, it can 
have fewer side effects than acute therapy.  
Third, as the competition among pharmaceutical firms (using an ecological term, 
these are generalists) become more and more intense, the set of generalist firms will be 
somewhat differentiated into different therapeutic areas.  When the smaller generalist 
pharmaceuticals fail, their markets become free resources. As a result, adjacent generalist 
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pharmaceutical firms may secure these free resources.  However, as some strategy 
researchers have argued, generalists may not secure the whole areas of free resources largely 
because “doing so might prove more costly than it is worth or entail loss of some of the 
firms’ existing target areas” (Carrol & Swaminathan, 2000: 719).  As a result, it is in these 
released and less congested market areas that specialty pharmaceutical firms can find their 
viable space.  
Fourth, the emergence of specialty pharmaceutical industry is also highly related to 
some external influences such as the emerging venture capital industry and more particularly 
the regulatory regime.  For instance, in the United States, if  less than 200,000 people have a 
particular condition it is classified by the federal government as an orphan disease.22  In 
1984, Congress enacted the Orphan Drug Act to create incentives to encourage manufacturers 
to develop products for diseases affecting relatively small numbers of patients.  Following the 
Act’s passage, many drugs were developed and introduced addressing these relatively rare 
diseases.    
There are also several unique aspects regarding specialty pharmaceutical firms. 
First, the specialty drugs usually can charge quite a high price, resulting in higher profit 
markups (usually as much as 250% of its cost).  Second, drugs companies that are specialized 
in certain therapeutic areas are eligible for certain privileges.  For instance, in the United 
State, when firms file certain drugs to the FDA, there are normally US $300,000 filing fees.  
However, for a specialty firm (whose products are used to cure orphan disease—whose target 
population is less than 200,000 people) the government will waive certain fees.  Since most 
 
22 We thank Dick Rylander, former president and founder of biopharmaceutical Strategies, LLC for bringing this 
issue up. 
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specialty pharmaceutical firms are small, young and therefore financially constrained, US $ 
200, 000 will be a huge amount of money to them.  In addition to that, drugs that are 
developed for orphan diseases can also get special attention for review and approval.  
Usually, this means that drug firms can do either fewer studies or smaller samples, which 
mean that completion of these studies is quite quick.  Third, the competitive arena in the 
specialty areas is quite different from that in traditional pharmaceutical field.  The industry is 
rather young and firms within this particular industry compete in several ways. For private 
companies, they are competing for funding from venture capitalists and some kind of private 
equity funding.  For public firms, they are competing for public investors, so their stock 
prices will go up. They also compete for strategic partners--the big pharmaceutical firms, 
which is also a form of financing.  Fourth, since many specialty firms are small and young, 
they typically have not commercialized their product when they went into IPO.  In fact, 
whether or not these firms can generate profit or certain revenue is not a necessary 
requirement for them to IPO.  They do not even need to go through phase three clinical stage 
to go for IPO.  The important issue here is to generate a good story that can attract public 
investors’ interest.  However, many firms do have phase two clinical stage data before they 
go to IPO.  This issue is particularly related to the performance implication of small specialty 
pharmaceutical firms, which we will discuss in a later chapter. 
 
M&As and Strategic Alliances in Pharmaceutical Industry 
Mergers & Acquisitions Activities  
As noted before, the concentration ratio in the pharmaceutical industry has  steadily 
increased over time.  Such an industry consolidation is largely the consequence of M&A 
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activities.  The pace of M&As in this industry starts to pick up around the end of the 1980s.  
The average annual deal was worth around 4.3 billion U.S $ at the beginning of the 1990s. 
The pace of consolidation rose to 25 billion in 1993 and 36.7 billion U.S $ in 1995. Since 
then, the level of activity remained at a high level (except for 1997 when the Asian financial 
crisis hit the industry significantly) and reached a record high at 133 billion in 1999 and 
stabilized at around 60 to 70 billion thereafter (See Figure 7 for details).  Behind the 
phenomenal M&A mania was the emergence of a pattern of activities during the past two 
decades.  
***Insert Figure 7 about here*** 
The first is the mega mergers where both acquirer and target are large and well-
known pharmaceutical firms.  Examples include Roche’s acquisition of Boehringer 
Mannheim in 1998, Pfizer’s takeover of Pharmacia in 2003 and Sanofi-Synthelabo’s 
acquisition of Aventis.  The value of these mega-mergers typically exceeded US $ 1 billion 
and created a huge impact on the industry and on society (such as employment, etc).  The 
second pattern is the M&As between generics pharmaceutical firms.  This type of acquisition 
is one of our major focuses in the current study.  There have been some notable examples in 
this pattern. For instance, in 2006, Teva of Israel regained the no.1 position after it bought US 
rival Ivax for $7.4 billion.  Meanwhile, smaller generics producers have conducted M&As as 
well, with some strategic purpose (such as geographical expansion).  An example would be 
Indian manufacturers buying in Europe and the US.  The third pattern involves M&As 
between specialty pharmaceutical firms, which is another major type of acquisition within 
our sample firms.  As competition among giant drug companies intensify, more market niche 
was either neglected or released, creating opportunity for the rapid growth of specialty firms.  
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Well-known examples include Protein Design Labs’s acquisition of ESP Pharma and MGI 
pharma’s acquisition of Guilford.  The fourth trend is for large biotech companies to acquire 
other biotechs.  Examples are the acquisition of Axxima by GPC Biotech and Immunex by 
Amgen.  The last common type of deal has involved larger pharmaceutical firms fueling their 
drug pipelines with the acquisition of a smaller biotech firms.  This trend is more recent.  
Examples are the Roche acquisition of Antisoma, the acquisition of Corixa and ID 
Biomedical by GlaxoSmithKline. 
The determinants of M&A activity in the pharmaceutical (biotechnology) industry 
vary by different patterns of M&As.  For mega mergers, they largely result from the excess 
capacity due to patent expirations and insufficient compounds in the pipeline, which can 
generate excessive production and marketing capacity (Danzon, et al., 2006).  Generic 
mergers, on the other hand, can create value for generic drug companies through the instant 
economies of scale (i.e., manufacturing and administrative capacity).  Generic drug firms 
need to achieve critical mass to lower their prices and compete aggressively for market share. 
For specialty firms’ M&As, the issue of excessive capacity due to patent expiration, and 
motives of economics of scale are less relevant since specialty firms are usually smaller, and 
not fully integrated.  These firms usually specialize in R&D devoted to either drug discovery 
or discovery-related technologies.  They might use an M&A strategy (purchasing marketed 
drugs, etc.) to generate sufficient revenue in the hope that it can be used to fund their 
innovative projects.  The motives behind the M&As between large pharmaceutical firms and 
small biotechnology firms lie in pharmaceutical firms’ interest in adding and upgrading its 
pipeline in a way that is more cost effective than developing internally from scratch.  From a 
biotechnology firm’s perspective, acquisitions might be an exit strategy to realize venture 
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capitalists’ and founders’ investments.  Finally, biotech-biotech M&As are driven by larger 
biotechnology acquirers’ desire to achieve critical mass and economies of scale.  
 
Strategic Alliance Activities  
We adopt a broad view of alliances, which capture all types of cooperative activity 
including joint ventures, equity stakes, marketing agreement, licensing agreement, joint 
development of R&D, and other licensing agreements (such as distribution, co-promotion, 
etc).  Over the past few decades, the role of alliances has become more and more critical for 
pharmaceutical companies to sustain their competitive advantage and meet their 
shareholders’ expectations.  In 2007, approximately 40 percent of revenues of the top 20 
pharmaceutical firms’ are expected to come from licensed products (Laroia & Krishnan, 
2005).  
Although there are some common theoretical rationales of why firms ally (such as 
organizational learning, transaction cost theory, resources-based view), our review tends to 
briefly point out the different motives for giant pharmaceutical/biotechnology firms, and 
small-medium size specialty / biotechnology firms, and then stress the key motivation for our 
sample firms, i.e. small and young specialty drug companies. Our review integrates  
theoretical views of alliances with interviews of key pharmaceutical executives.  For big-
pharmaceuticals, strategic alliances are a way to acquire new technological capabilities 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005), innovative compounds (usually from small biotechnology or 
specialty firms), or complementary skill sets in downstream activities (such as marketing or 
distribution—usually from other big pharmaceuticals, e.g. Novatis drawing on GSK’s sale 
forces to sell).  Alliances, to big pharmaceuticals, are a strategic response to the changing 
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environment as mentioned above, such as the upcoming patent expiration, gap in existing 
pipeline, lower productivity of internal R&D, and reduction of profit from new product 
launch.  Similarly, large bio-pharmaceutical firms’ engagement in strategic alliances is more 
driven by the need to complement their technological capabilities in the aim to improve their 
financial structure and to obtain innovative drugs (Ohba & Figueiredo, 2007).  
For small and medium size firms (either specialty or biotechnology), their 
motivation to enter strategic alliances is to achieve commercial application of their in-house 
innovative technological capabilities and to engage in new activities (e.g. drug 
commercialization in the global pharmaceutical market).  Since small specialty firms do not 
have a downstream function, they have to draw on big-pharmaceuticals or big bio-
pharmaceuticals to manufacture or market their products.  Typically, these small firms will 
out-license their technologies to big-pharmaceutical firms and receive royalty revenues in 
return.  In particular, specialty firms’ overall market in a specific (U.S) context is rather small 
because of the nature of diseases they treat.  So these firms will have to go international to 
access a unique market of patients globally.  It is not economically feasible for them to set up 
a subsidiary or acquire existing pharmaceutical firms in those countries.  Meanwhile, 
different countries have very different requirements for pricing, reimbursement and 
promotional efforts.  It is a huge nightmare for large pharmaceutical firms to explore these 
markets alone.  For instance, France has less pricing freedom regarding drug sales than that 
of U.S.   It is financially rational to ally with a regional partner (e.g., a French company or 
other big company whose headquarter is in Europe such as Bayer) when small specialty firms 
try to enter into the French market.  Small biotechnology firms face similar constraints when 
they plan to internationalize their product markets.  For instance, Amgen was a small 
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company when they launched their Epogen, when they had actually a partner in the U.S ( 
Johnson & Johnson).  J&J maintained the right to sell Amgen’s Epogen to the rest of the 
world (Pal, 2007).  
Furthermore, small specialty and biotechnology firms also cooperate with large 
pharmaceutical firms on the development of drug.  Typically, there are four stages in the 
development of a drug: one pre-clinical stage and three phases of clinical trials.  Phase 1 is all 
about safety with a small number of people.  Phase 2 is about beginning to show efficacy.  In 
Phase 3, firms should achieve statistical validity based on large population. The total cost of 
running phases 1,2 and3 typically is in excess of a hundred million dollars. In particular, 
phases 1 and 2 may not be a major hurdle for most small specialty firms. It is phase 3 that is 
most costly and risky.  If failed, the company’s prospect will be quickly in jeopardy. Small 
specialty firms usually partner with large pharmaceutical firms to access latter’ financial and 
human capitals to conduct phase 3 clinical trials.  To quote a senior pharmaceutical 
executive: “So you need data that shows that you have a lead chemical compound.  And then 
you need to partner with somebody who’s got the resources to actually conduct that Phase 3 
clinical trial.  And that’s really been the model that all these companies now use.  Get good 
data and then form a strategic alliance with somebody big, somebody who has deep enough 
pockets to bring the thing to market” (Vanderlaan, 2007).  Recent research also shows that 
products developed in an alliance between small and large pharmaceutical firms tend to have 
a higher probability of success (i.e. getting approval eventually), particularly in more 
complex phase 3 trials (Danzon, Nicholson, & Pereira, 2005, DiMasi, 2001; Arora, 
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Gambardella, Pommolli, & Riccaboni, 2000).23  In addition, large pharmaceutical firms also 
prefer to cooperate with small specialty firms on developing phase 3 drugs, because the 
probability of success in phase 3 is usually 73% compare with 7% at pre-clinical stage, 23% 
at phase 1 and 33% at phase 2 (Fischette, 2004).  
Last, small specialty firms’ motivation to ally with large pharmaceutical firms is also 
related with transfer of status and the signaling effect.  Small specialty firms or young 
biotechnology firms suffer from liability of smallness and/or newness. The strategy literature 
suggests that they can increase their chances of survival and access to external resources by 
gaining legitimacy via ties with prestigious businesses (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999; 
Gulati & Higgins, 2003).  In the competitive arena, small specialty firms compete for finance 
and investors’ attention.  For listed companies, their audience is public investor and 
institutional investors.  For firms that struggle for IPO, their audience is venture capitalist and 
other individual investors.  Allying with a large pharmaceutical firm allows a small specialty 
firm to send a signal of its quality to the financial markets under the assumption that there is 
an information asymmetry between specialty firms and investors, and pharmaceutical firms 
can better evaluate the quality of small specialty firms’ technological know-how and 
managerial capability.  This assumption is quite true particularly when small firms operate in 
specialty domains where knowledge is quite specialized and therefore less likely to be 
evaluated accurately by general public investor and venture capitalists.  In other words, 
 
23 On the contrary, Pisano (1997) argued the opposite, i.e. products co-developed in an alliance are less likely to 
succeed in clinical trials than drugs that are developed by a single small firm. He proposed a “lemons” 
hypothesis that stressed the information advantages small firms have regarding their drug candidates. Danzon et 
al. (2005: 7) argued that “the positive benefit from collaboration with a more experienced partner appears to 
dominate any moral hazard effect that might result from the sharing of gains in alliance, and any lemons or 
adverse selection effects”. 
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pharmaceutical firms, in this case, perform a validating function which is usually assumed by 
financial intermediaries (Nicholson, Danzon, McCullough, 2005).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Global Pharmaceutical Industry Merger & Acquisition 
(In terms of value: US $ in billions)—A Historical View24 
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24 Source: Chemical Market Reporter, “Global Pharmaceutical M&As are already at a Record Pace,” Oct 4, 
1999, Chemical Market Reporter,”The search for APIs Drives Pharmaceutical Mergers and Acquisitions,” Mar 
17, 2003, Business Insights, “ Pharmaceutical M&A: the third wave”, 1999, Pharmaceutical Business Strategies, 
“Pharma M&A report: First half of 2004”, Oct 2004,  Mar 2008, Weilei Shi Estimates.  
 84 
 
Figure 7.  U.S Specialty Pharmaceutical Industry Breakdown by Therapeutic 
Areas in 2003 (US $ in billions)25 
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25 Source: IMS Health, JP Morgan Industry Update, “ Specialty Pharmacy: Conduit of Growth for 
Biotechnology,” March 14, 2003, Bear Stearns Health Care Distribution, “ Specialty Pharmacy Services: 
Among the Fastest-Growing Areas of Health Care,” November 2003, Caremark Estimates.  
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APPENDIX D 
[ORIGINAL RESUTLS BY USING STRANDAR DEVIATION AND SKEWNESS] 
. xtgls      t_qlogf1   an_ac_a an_al_a assetlog roa indum stage  assetper  lev 
> erage  branded  stock_a  rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force panel(hetero) 
note: y2000 dropped due to collinearity 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.5901) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       372 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        29          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  10.05405 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(27)      =    225.07 
Log likelihood             = -197.0288          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    t_qlogf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |     .00055   .0105441     0.05   0.958     -.020116    .0212161 
     an_al_a |   .0351135   .0229229     1.53   0.126    -.0098146    .0800415 
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    assetlog |  -.2337202   .0421666    -5.54   0.000    -.3163652   -.1510752 
         roa |  -.1512208   .1018236    -1.49   0.138    -.3507915    .0483499 
       indum |   .0328416   .1874106     0.18   0.861    -.3344765    .4001597 
       stage |   .0981044   .1017294     0.96   0.335    -.1012816    .2974903 
    assetper |   .0257947   .0102508     2.52   0.012     .0057034    .0458859 
    leverage |   .0011499    .003236     0.36   0.722    -.0051926    .0074925 
     branded |    .117907   .1177893     1.00   0.317    -.1129557    .3487697 
     stock_a |   .0001099   .0000302     3.65   0.000     .0000508     .000169 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0525234   .0283425    -1.85   0.064    -.1080737     .003027 
       y1986 |  -.1273341    .272965    -0.47   0.641    -.6623357    .4076674 
       y1987 |  -.1533508   .2471871    -0.62   0.535    -.6378285     .331127 
       y1988 |  -.0312864    .225205    -0.14   0.890      -.47268    .4101072 
       y1989 |   .1870456   .2259015     0.83   0.408    -.2557132    .6298044 
       y1990 |   .5192199   .2110845     2.46   0.014     .1055019     .932938 
       y1991 |   .3021853   .2184652     1.38   0.167    -.1259987    .7303692 
       y1992 |   .2839029   .2169942     1.31   0.191     -.141398    .7092037 
       y1993 |   .0442692   .2146253     0.21   0.837    -.3763887    .4649271 
       y1994 |   .4027005   .2109452     1.91   0.056    -.0107444    .8161455 
       y1995 |   .2898852   .1942536     1.49   0.136    -.0908449    .6706154 
       y1996 |   .1923953   .1654291     1.16   0.245    -.1318398    .5166304 
       y1997 |  -.0026853    .130814    -0.02   0.984    -.2590761    .2537054 
       y1998 |   .1915451   .1077766     1.78   0.076    -.0196932    .4027833 
       y1999 |   .0339534   .0761447     0.45   0.656    -.1152875    .1831943 
       y2001 |  -.4750673   .0687544    -6.91   0.000    -.6098234   -.3403112 
       y2002 |  -.0782955   .0943584    -0.83   0.407    -.2632346    .1066436 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   1.209007   .3790103     3.19   0.001     .4661606    1.951854 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      t_qlogf1   an_ac_a an_al_a sd_ac_al_a assetlog roa indum stage  as 
> setper  leverage  branded  stock_a  rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force pan 
> el(hetero) 
note: y2000 dropped due to collinearity 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
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Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.5893) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       371 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        30          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  10.02703 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(28)      =    247.40 
Log likelihood             = -193.4688          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    t_qlogf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |   -.037199   .0324257    -1.15   0.251    -.1007522    .0263542 
     an_al_a |  -.0100595   .0382037    -0.26   0.792    -.0849373    .0648183 
  sd_ac_al_a |   .1195873   .0907603     1.32   0.188    -.0582997    .2974743 
    assetlog |  -.2337752   .0411761    -5.68   0.000     -.314479   -.1530715 
         roa |  -.1312929   .1014749    -1.29   0.196      -.33018    .0675942 
       indum |    .042134   .1869219     0.23   0.822    -.3242262    .4084942 
       stage |   .0620177    .101514     0.61   0.541     -.136946    .2609815 
    assetper |   .0227106   .0096034     2.36   0.018     .0038882    .0415329 
    leverage |   .0016279   .0032696     0.50   0.619    -.0047805    .0080362 
     branded |   .1102534   .1164456     0.95   0.344    -.1179758    .3384826 
     stock_a |    .000107   .0000301     3.55   0.000     .0000479     .000166 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0534316   .0283283    -1.89   0.059     -.108954    .0020908 
       y1986 |  -.1206875   .2738924    -0.44   0.659    -.6575068    .4161319 
       y1987 |    -.14452   .2481311    -0.58   0.560     -.630848    .3418081 
       y1988 |  -.0372904   .2262817    -0.16   0.869    -.4807943    .4062135 
       y1989 |    .184033   .2268058     0.81   0.417    -.2604981    .6285641 
       y1990 |   .5211563   .2120409     2.46   0.014     .1055639    .9367488 
       y1991 |   .2931156   .2193282     1.34   0.181    -.1367598    .7229909 
       y1992 |   .2654784   .2181712     1.22   0.224    -.1621293    .6930862 
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       y1993 |   .0235998   .2160899     0.11   0.913    -.3999286    .4471282 
       y1994 |   .3806566   .2119059     1.80   0.072    -.0346714    .7959846 
       y1995 |   .2676275   .1951941     1.37   0.170     -.114946     .650201 
       y1996 |   .1671863   .1661823     1.01   0.314    -.1585251    .4928976 
       y1997 |  -.0333371   .1314649    -0.25   0.800    -.2910035    .2243294 
       y1998 |   .1552661    .108282     1.43   0.152    -.0569628    .3674949 
       y1999 |   .0363536   .0745322     0.49   0.626    -.1097269    .1824341 
       y2001 |  -.4725593   .0646273    -7.31   0.000    -.5992265   -.3458921 
       y2002 |  -.0758241   .0902657    -0.84   0.401    -.2527415    .1010934 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   1.276139   .3780912     3.38   0.001     .5350938    2.017184 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      t_qlogf1   an_ac_a an_al_a sd_ac_al_a  sd_ac_al_a_sq assetlog roa  
> indum stage  assetper  leverage  branded  stock_a  rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr 
> (ar1) force panel(hetero) 
note: y2000 dropped due to collinearity 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (-0.6453) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       371 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        31          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  10.02703 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(29)      =    475.10 
Log likelihood             = -391.6767          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    t_qlogf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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     an_ac_a |   .0424634   .0234222     1.81   0.070    -.0034433    .0883701 
     an_al_a |   .0386134    .023724     1.63   0.104    -.0078848    .0851115 
  sd_ac_al_a |    .224415   .0579727     3.87   0.000     .1107905    .3380395 
sd_ac_al_a~q |  -.0295568   .0030591    -9.66   0.000    -.0355526    -.023561 
    assetlog |  -.2776147   .0260336   -10.66   0.000    -.3286397   -.2265897 
         roa |  -.5225848   .1147618    -4.55   0.000    -.7475138   -.2976558 
       indum |  -.1515877   .0898124    -1.69   0.091    -.3276167    .0244413 
       stage |   .1207903   .0545888     2.21   0.027     .0137982    .2277825 
    assetper |    .057169   .0179758     3.18   0.001     .0219371     .092401 
    leverage |   .0104541   .0051404     2.03   0.042      .000379    .0205291 
     branded |    .200365     .06026     3.33   0.001     .0822575    .3184724 
     stock_a |   .0000158   .0000452     0.35   0.726    -.0000728    .0001045 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0693057   .0160154    -4.33   0.000    -.1006953   -.0379161 
       y1986 |  -.6280824   .4901867    -1.28   0.200    -1.588831    .3326659 
       y1987 |  -.5555775   .3839812    -1.45   0.148    -1.308167    .1970119 
       y1988 |   -.609248   .5055979    -1.21   0.228    -1.600202    .3817057 
       y1989 |  -.3245625   .3516591    -0.92   0.356    -1.013802    .3646767 
       y1990 |   .0938593   .4613549     0.20   0.839    -.8103797    .9980983 
       y1991 |  -.2004766   .3408572    -0.59   0.556    -.8685444    .4675912 
       y1992 |  -.3139529   .3796816    -0.83   0.408    -1.058115    .4302093 
       y1993 |  -.7344373   .3390946    -2.17   0.030     -1.39905   -.0698241 
       y1994 |   -.176859   .3486643    -0.51   0.612    -.8602284    .5065105 
       y1995 |  -.1991157   .3087169    -0.64   0.519    -.8041896    .4059583 
       y1996 |  -.3364063   .2673717    -1.26   0.208    -.8604452    .1876326 
       y1997 |  -.3605684   .2131319    -1.69   0.091    -.7782992    .0571624 
       y1998 |   .0013389   .1695245     0.01   0.994    -.3309231    .3336009 
       y1999 |  -.0183804    .187297    -0.10   0.922    -.3854757     .348715 
       y2001 |  -.4927651   .1831445    -2.69   0.007    -.8517217   -.1338086 
       y2002 |  -.1287235   .1414226    -0.91   0.363    -.4059067    .1484597 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   2.110388   .4653319     4.54   0.000     1.198355    3.022422 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      t_qlogf1  an_ac_a an_al_a  sd_an_ac_a   sd_an_al_a  assetlog roa i 
> ndum stage  assetper  leverage  branded  stock_a  rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr( 
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> ar1) force panel(hetero) 
note: y2000 dropped due to collinearity 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.5873) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       371 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        31          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  10.02703 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(29)      =    237.15 
Log likelihood             = -194.1621          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    t_qlogf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0343447   .0366602    -0.94   0.349    -.1061975    .0375081 
     an_al_a |   .0355825   .0900724     0.40   0.693    -.1409561    .2121212 
  sd_an_ac_a |   .1067719   .1004684     1.06   0.288    -.0901426    .3036863 
  sd_an_al_a |   .0020537   .2180937     0.01   0.992     -.425402    .4295094 
    assetlog |  -.2370858   .0419202    -5.66   0.000    -.3192479   -.1549238 
         roa |  -.1334762   .1018686    -1.31   0.190     -.333135    .0661826 
       indum |   .0382872   .1861804     0.21   0.837    -.3266196    .4031941 
       stage |   .0689677    .103311     0.67   0.504    -.1335182    .2714535 
    assetper |   .0233968   .0099674     2.35   0.019     .0038612    .0429325 
    leverage |   .0015203   .0032778     0.46   0.643    -.0049041    .0079446 
     branded |   .1143361   .1171161     0.98   0.329    -.1152072    .3438795 
     stock_a |   .0001082   .0000302     3.58   0.000     .0000491    .0001674 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0534956   .0282262    -1.90   0.058    -.1088179    .0018267 
       y1986 |  -.1272893   .2726983    -0.47   0.641    -.6617681    .4071895 
       y1987 |  -.1486445   .2469416    -0.60   0.547    -.6326411    .3353522 
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       y1988 |  -.0349651   .2249755    -0.16   0.876    -.4759089    .4059788 
       y1989 |   .1840771   .2256731     0.82   0.415    -.2582341    .6263882 
       y1990 |   .5182004   .2108484     2.46   0.014     .1049452    .9314556 
       y1991 |   .2922163   .2182873     1.34   0.181    -.1356189    .7200515 
       y1992 |   .2702516   .2171958     1.24   0.213    -.1554444    .6959476 
       y1993 |    .029376   .2151301     0.14   0.891    -.3922712    .4510233 
       y1994 |   .3841046   .2110101     1.82   0.069    -.0294676    .7976767 
       y1995 |   .2716468    .194578     1.40   0.163    -.1097191    .6530127 
       y1996 |   .1733819   .1657383     1.05   0.296    -.1514592    .4982231 
       y1997 |  -.0301726   .1312276    -0.23   0.818    -.2873739    .2270288 
       y1998 |   .1556947   .1087286     1.43   0.152    -.0574095    .3687988 
       y1999 |   .0363355   .0753522     0.48   0.630    -.1113521    .1840231 
       y2001 |  -.4682253   .0666418    -7.03   0.000    -.5988409   -.3376097 
       y2002 |  -.0707664   .0926303    -0.76   0.445    -.2523185    .1107857 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   1.274681   .3783495     3.37   0.001     .5331301    2.016233 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      t_qlogf1  an_ac_a an_al_a sd_an_ac_a   sd_an_al_a   sd_an_ac_a_sq  
>  sd_an_al_a_sq  assetlog roa indum stage  assetper  leverage  branded  stock_ 
> a  rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force panel(hetero) 
note: y2000 dropped due to collinearity 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.7481) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       371 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        33          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  10.02703 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(31)      =    270.84 
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Log likelihood             = -174.1527          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    t_qlogf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0327714   .0386926    -0.85   0.397    -.1086076    .0430647 
     an_al_a |   .0915564     .09168     1.00   0.318     -.088133    .2712459 
  sd_an_ac_a |    .252696   .1178465     2.14   0.032     .0217211    .4836709 
  sd_an_al_a |  -.0049894   .2418074    -0.02   0.984    -.4789232    .4689444 
sd_an_ac_a~q |  -.0189935   .0087749    -2.16   0.030     -.036192   -.0017951 
sd_an_al_a~q |  -.0523093   .0492249    -1.06   0.288    -.1487884    .0441697 
    assetlog |  -.2967821   .0516952    -5.74   0.000    -.3981028   -.1954614 
         roa |  -.1126182   .0965986    -1.17   0.244    -.3019479    .0767116 
       indum |   .0428334   .2638343     0.16   0.871    -.4742722    .5599391 
       stage |   .1873947   .1328877     1.41   0.158    -.0730604    .4478498 
    assetper |   .0255002   .0090981     2.80   0.005     .0076683    .0433322 
    leverage |    .002154   .0031174     0.69   0.490     -.003956    .0082639 
     branded |   .1602839     .15864     1.01   0.312    -.1506449    .4712127 
     stock_a |   .0001111   .0000312     3.55   0.000     .0000498    .0001723 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0402168   .0343356    -1.17   0.241    -.1075134    .0270797 
       y1986 |  -.1214238   .2616578    -0.46   0.643    -.6342637     .391416 
       y1987 |  -.1290246   .2315006    -0.56   0.577    -.5827574    .3247081 
       y1988 |  -.0127537   .2086179    -0.06   0.951    -.4216373    .3961298 
       y1989 |    .212814   .2067059     1.03   0.303    -.1923222    .6179502 
       y1990 |   .5074127   .1959793     2.59   0.010     .1233003    .8915251 
       y1991 |   .2995716   .2057978     1.46   0.145    -.1037846    .7029279 
       y1992 |   .2614818   .2103027     1.24   0.214     -.150704    .6736676 
       y1993 |   .0474141   .2113533     0.22   0.822    -.3668307    .4616589 
       y1994 |   .3602443   .2102117     1.71   0.087    -.0517632    .7722517 
       y1995 |   .2475651   .1956724     1.27   0.206    -.1359457    .6310759 
       y1996 |   .1672806   .1673833     1.00   0.318    -.1607847    .4953459 
       y1997 |  -.0415363   .1321446    -0.31   0.753     -.300535    .2174624 
       y1998 |   .1262143   .1063174     1.19   0.235    -.0821639    .3345926 
       y1999 |   .0230847   .0693182     0.33   0.739    -.1127765    .1589458 
       y2001 |  -.4315149   .0604057    -7.14   0.000    -.5499078    -.313122 
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       y2002 |  -.0212225   .0905729    -0.23   0.815    -.1987421    .1562971 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   1.196729   .4420794     2.71   0.007     .3302697    2.063189 
 
 
 
. xtgls       roaf1    an_ac_a an_al_a assetlog roa indum stage  assetper  leve 
> rage  branded  rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force panel(hetero) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.0858) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       373 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        29          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  10.08108 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(27)      =    434.41 
Log likelihood             =  222.6255          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       roaf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0011856   .0019809    -0.60   0.549    -.0050682    .0026969 
     an_al_a |  -.0060843   .0046749    -1.30   0.193    -.0152469    .0030783 
    assetlog |   .0080867   .0083868     0.96   0.335    -.0083511    .0245246 
         roa |   .4904614   .0476735    10.29   0.000      .397023    .5838998 
       indum |   .0182912   .0300403     0.61   0.543    -.0405867    .0771692 
       stage |   .0155706   .0126349     1.23   0.218    -.0091933    .0403346 
    assetper |   .0025429   .0038916     0.65   0.513    -.0050845    .0101704 
    leverage |  -.0018247   .0011135    -1.64   0.101    -.0040072    .0003578 
     branded |  -.0194784   .0152293    -1.28   0.201    -.0493272    .0103705 
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    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0471055    .009602    -4.91   0.000    -.0659251    -.028286 
       y1986 |   .0587781   .1324152     0.44   0.657     -.200751    .3183072 
       y1987 |   .0437426   .1317823     0.33   0.740     -.214546    .3020313 
       y1988 |   .0511683   .1303376     0.39   0.695    -.2042887    .3066254 
       y1989 |   .0472088   .1311124     0.36   0.719    -.2097668    .3041844 
       y1990 |   .0296891   .1299686     0.23   0.819    -.2250447     .284423 
       y1991 |   .0663275    .130485     0.51   0.611    -.1894185    .3220734 
       y1992 |   .0300602   .1301873     0.23   0.817    -.2251022    .2852226 
       y1993 |   .0553994   .1300047     0.43   0.670    -.1994052    .3102039 
       y1994 |   .0597703   .1298111     0.46   0.645    -.1946547    .3141954 
       y1995 |   .0321904   .1301198     0.25   0.805    -.2228397    .2872204 
       y1996 |   .0694291   .1301982     0.53   0.594    -.1857547    .3246129 
       y1997 |    .014662   .1301288     0.11   0.910    -.2403857    .2697097 
       y1998 |   .0878949    .130251     0.67   0.500    -.1673924    .3431822 
       y1999 |   .0639286   .1298494     0.49   0.622    -.1905714    .3184287 
       y2000 |   .0550585   .1299362     0.42   0.672    -.1996117    .3097287 
       y2001 |   .0507731   .1300934     0.39   0.696    -.2042054    .3057515 
       y2002 |   .0484339   .1304401     0.37   0.710     -.207224    .3040918 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -.0977528   .1324755    -0.74   0.461    -.3574001    .1618944 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      roaf1   an_ac_a an_al_a sd_ac_al_a assetlog roa indum stage  asset 
> per  leverage  branded   rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force panel(hetero) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.0849) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       372 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        30          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  10.05405 
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                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(28)      =    434.65 
Log likelihood             =  221.3206          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       roaf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0030595   .0051707    -0.59   0.554    -.0131938    .0070748 
     an_al_a |  -.0084687   .0076203    -1.11   0.266    -.0234041    .0064668 
  sd_ac_al_a |   .0054322   .0140897     0.39   0.700    -.0221832    .0330476 
    assetlog |    .008508    .008445     1.01   0.314    -.0080439    .0250599 
         roa |   .4913854   .0476876    10.30   0.000     .3979194    .5848513 
       indum |    .020095   .0303118     0.66   0.507    -.0393149     .079505 
       stage |   .0147437   .0129018     1.14   0.253    -.0105435    .0400308 
    assetper |   .0021073   .0039092     0.54   0.590    -.0055547    .0097692 
    leverage |  -.0017901   .0011239    -1.59   0.111     -.003993    .0004127 
     branded |  -.0195154   .0152556    -1.28   0.201    -.0494158    .0103849 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0472237   .0096067    -4.92   0.000    -.0660526   -.0283948 
       y1986 |   .0597875   .1311572     0.46   0.649    -.1972758    .3168509 
       y1987 |   .0443413   .1305093     0.34   0.734    -.2114521    .3001348 
       y1988 |   .0512749   .1290557     0.40   0.691    -.2016696    .3042193 
       y1989 |   .0469998   .1298395     0.36   0.717     -.207481    .3014805 
       y1990 |   .0289546   .1286719     0.23   0.822    -.2232377     .281147 
       y1991 |    .066855   .1291848     0.52   0.605    -.1863425    .3200526 
       y1992 |   .0294707   .1289025     0.23   0.819    -.2231735    .2821148 
       y1993 |   .0542836   .1287436     0.42   0.673    -.1980492    .3066164 
       y1994 |   .0591803   .1285337     0.46   0.645    -.1927412    .3111018 
       y1995 |   .0319733   .1288453     0.25   0.804    -.2205588    .2845054 
       y1996 |   .0693795   .1289317     0.54   0.591    -.1833219     .322081 
       y1997 |   .0135077   .1288723     0.10   0.917    -.2390774    .2660928 
       y1998 |   .0893445   .1291033     0.69   0.489    -.1636932    .3423823 
       y1999 |   .0646186   .1285978     0.50   0.615    -.1874285    .3166658 
       y2000 |   .0539101   .1286528     0.42   0.675    -.1982449     .306065 
       y2001 |   .0518903   .1288159     0.40   0.687    -.2005843    .3043649 
       y2002 |   .0488911   .1291535     0.38   0.705    -.2042451    .3020273 
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       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -.0994903   .1312223    -0.76   0.448    -.3566812    .1577007 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls       roaf1   an_ac_a an_al_a sd_ac_al_a  sd_ac_al_a_sq assetlog roa in 
> dum stage  assetper  leverage  branded   rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) forc 
> e panel(hetero) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.0665) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       372 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        31          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  10.05405 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(29)      =    459.93 
Log likelihood             =  222.4331          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       roaf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0007885   .0056314    -0.14   0.889    -.0118259    .0102488 
     an_al_a |  -.0076409    .007657    -1.00   0.318    -.0226484    .0073666 
  sd_ac_al_a |   .0193102   .0161059     1.20   0.231    -.0122568    .0508773 
sd_ac_al_a~q |   -.002042   .0011019    -1.85   0.064    -.0042017    .0001178 
    assetlog |   .0009432   .0091623     0.10   0.918    -.0170145    .0189009 
         roa |    .493595   .0475253    10.39   0.000     .4004472    .5867428 
       indum |   .0076613   .0316569     0.24   0.809     -.054385    .0697077 
       stage |   .0249314   .0140105     1.78   0.075    -.0025286    .0523915 
    assetper |   .0028186   .0041363     0.68   0.496    -.0052884    .0109256 
    leverage |  -.0016653   .0011225    -1.48   0.138    -.0038654    .0005348 
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     branded |   -.012677   .0153755    -0.82   0.410    -.0428124    .0174583 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0473557   .0095051    -4.98   0.000    -.0659853    -.028726 
       y1986 |   .0625699   .1274931     0.49   0.624     -.187312    .3124518 
       y1987 |   .0480705   .1267394     0.38   0.704    -.2003341    .2964752 
       y1988 |   .0498911   .1254095     0.40   0.691     -.195907    .2956892 
       y1989 |   .0459848   .1261102     0.36   0.715    -.2011867    .2931563 
       y1990 |   .0258257   .1249893     0.21   0.836    -.2191489    .2708002 
       y1991 |    .064249   .1254392     0.51   0.609    -.1816073    .3101053 
       y1992 |    .019865   .1252175     0.16   0.874    -.2255569    .2652868 
       y1993 |   .0467078   .1250085     0.37   0.709    -.1983043    .2917199 
       y1994 |   .0503948   .1248445     0.40   0.686    -.1942958    .2950854 
       y1995 |   .0225792   .1251403     0.18   0.857    -.2226912    .2678497 
       y1996 |   .0616924   .1252334     0.49   0.622    -.1837605    .3071454 
       y1997 |  -.0006682   .1251737    -0.01   0.996    -.2460041    .2446677 
       y1998 |   .0812094   .1254327     0.65   0.517    -.1646341     .327053 
       y1999 |   .0566042   .1249548     0.45   0.651    -.1883027     .301511 
       y2000 |   .0486727   .1249508     0.39   0.697    -.1962264    .2935718 
       y2001 |   .0464578   .1250897     0.37   0.710    -.1987135    .2916291 
       y2002 |   .0444864   .1254515     0.35   0.723     -.201394    .2903669 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -.0815041   .1277024    -0.64   0.523    -.3317962    .1687881 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      roaf1  an_ac_a an_al_a sd_an_ac_a   sd_an_al_a  assetlog roa indum 
>  stage  assetper  leverage  branded   rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force p 
> anel(hetero) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.0846) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       372 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
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Estimated coefficients     =        31          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  10.05405 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(29)      =    437.05 
Log likelihood             =  220.4916          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       roaf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0027293     .00546    -0.50   0.617    -.0134307     .007972 
     an_al_a |  -.0066578   .0190002    -0.35   0.726    -.0438975    .0305819 
  sd_an_ac_a |   .0044238   .0149049     0.30   0.767    -.0247893     .033637 
  sd_an_al_a |   .0013218   .0465123     0.03   0.977    -.0898406    .0924843 
    assetlog |   .0081604   .0088437     0.92   0.356    -.0091729    .0254938 
         roa |    .493917    .048532    10.18   0.000      .398796    .5890379 
       indum |   .0191781   .0308692     0.62   0.534    -.0413244    .0796806 
       stage |    .015378   .0136897     1.12   0.261    -.0114532    .0422092 
    assetper |   .0022028   .0040364     0.55   0.585    -.0057084    .0101141 
    leverage |  -.0017401   .0011579    -1.50   0.133    -.0040095    .0005292 
     branded |  -.0186147   .0171035    -1.09   0.276    -.0521368    .0149075 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0472345    .009609    -4.92   0.000    -.0660678   -.0284013 
       y1986 |   .0602115   .1281183     0.47   0.638    -.1908958    .3113188 
       y1987 |   .0444955   .1272866     0.35   0.727    -.2049817    .2939727 
       y1988 |   .0512396   .1256928     0.41   0.684    -.1951138    .2975931 
       y1989 |   .0471628   .1265302     0.37   0.709    -.2008318    .2951574 
       y1990 |   .0294563    .125268     0.24   0.814    -.2160645    .2749772 
       y1991 |   .0662285   .1257751     0.53   0.598    -.1802862    .3127432 
       y1992 |   .0288802   .1254715     0.23   0.818    -.2170395    .2747999 
       y1993 |   .0537632   .1253055     0.43   0.668     -.191831    .2993575 
       y1994 |   .0592523   .1251015     0.47   0.636    -.1859422    .3044468 
       y1995 |    .031002   .1254488     0.25   0.805    -.2148731    .2768771 
       y1996 |   .0690511   .1255588     0.55   0.582    -.1770396    .3151419 
       y1997 |   .0142078   .1254809     0.11   0.910    -.2317303     .260146 
       y1998 |   .0889826   .1257138     0.71   0.479    -.1574118    .3353771 
       y1999 |   .0647965   .1251791     0.52   0.605      -.18055     .310143 
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       y2000 |   .0551193   .1252718     0.44   0.660     -.190409    .3006476 
       y2001 |   .0504286   .1254506     0.40   0.688    -.1954502    .2963073 
       y2002 |   .0478558   .1258222     0.38   0.704    -.1987513    .2944629 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -.0985008    .128019    -0.77   0.442    -.3494134    .1524119 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      roaf1  an_ac_a an_al_a sd_an_ac_a   sd_an_al_a   sd_an_ac_a_sq  sd 
> _an_al_a_sq assetlog roa indum stage  assetper  leverage  branded    rd_i_mf3 
>  y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force panel(hetero) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.0710) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       372 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        33          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  10.05405 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(31)      =    458.91 
Log likelihood             =  221.6477          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       roaf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0004547   .0058888    -0.08   0.938    -.0119966    .0110872 
     an_al_a |  -.0004627   .0189365    -0.02   0.981    -.0375776    .0366522 
  sd_an_ac_a |   .0152566   .0187452     0.81   0.416    -.0214833    .0519965 
  sd_an_al_a |   .0048873   .0495043     0.10   0.921    -.0921393    .1019139 
sd_an_ac_a~q |  -.0021702   .0015807    -1.37   0.170    -.0052683     .000928 
sd_an_al_a~q |  -.0079468   .0101076    -0.79   0.432    -.0277573    .0118638 
    assetlog |   .0000788   .0102904     0.01   0.994    -.0200899    .0202476 
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         roa |   .4966573   .0483574    10.27   0.000     .4018785    .5914362 
       indum |   .0106899   .0317563     0.34   0.736    -.0515512    .0729311 
       stage |   .0238541   .0148316     1.61   0.108    -.0052153    .0529235 
    assetper |   .0031948   .0042997     0.74   0.457    -.0052324    .0116221 
    leverage |  -.0016839   .0011423    -1.47   0.140    -.0039228    .0005549 
     branded |  -.0132696   .0171576    -0.77   0.439    -.0468978    .0203586 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0473236   .0095388    -4.96   0.000    -.0660193   -.0286279 
       y1986 |   .0605337    .130616     0.46   0.643    -.1954691    .3165364 
       y1987 |    .046903   .1298061     0.36   0.718    -.2075121    .3013182 
       y1988 |   .0513405   .1284191     0.40   0.689    -.2003563    .3030373 
       y1989 |   .0469954   .1291181     0.36   0.716    -.2060714    .3000621 
       y1990 |   .0266008   .1280232     0.21   0.835    -.2243201    .2775217 
       y1991 |   .0646477   .1284677     0.50   0.615    -.1871443    .3164397 
       y1992 |   .0237988   .1282255     0.19   0.853    -.2275187    .2751162 
       y1993 |   .0495162   .1280287     0.39   0.699    -.2014154    .3004478 
       y1994 |   .0521869   .1279295     0.41   0.683    -.1985504    .3029242 
       y1995 |    .024306   .1282613     0.19   0.850    -.2270815    .2756935 
       y1996 |   .0652631   .1283432     0.51   0.611     -.186285    .3168111 
       y1997 |   .0048572   .1282513     0.04   0.970    -.2465107     .256225 
       y1998 |   .0852205   .1284739     0.66   0.507    -.1665837    .3370247 
       y1999 |   .0611133   .1280048     0.48   0.633    -.1897715    .3119981 
       y2000 |   .0553485   .1280705     0.43   0.666    -.1956652    .3063621 
       y2001 |   .0501865   .1282639     0.39   0.696     -.201206    .3015791 
       y2002 |   .0495707    .128624     0.39   0.700    -.2025278    .3016692 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -.0787131   .1311557    -0.60   0.548    -.3357735    .1783473 
 
 
Original Results by Using Skewness 
 
. xtgls      t_qlogf1   an_ac_a an_al_a assetlog roa indum stage  assetper  lev 
> erage  branded  stock_a  rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force panel(hetero) 
note: y2000 dropped due to collinearity 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
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Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.5901) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       372 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        29          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  10.05405 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(27)      =    225.07 
Log likelihood             = -197.0288          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    t_qlogf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |     .00055   .0105441     0.05   0.958     -.020116    .0212161 
     an_al_a |   .0351135   .0229229     1.53   0.126    -.0098146    .0800415 
    assetlog |  -.2337202   .0421666    -5.54   0.000    -.3163652   -.1510752 
         roa |  -.1512208   .1018236    -1.49   0.138    -.3507915    .0483499 
       indum |   .0328416   .1874106     0.18   0.861    -.3344765    .4001597 
       stage |   .0981044   .1017294     0.96   0.335    -.1012816    .2974903 
    assetper |   .0257947   .0102508     2.52   0.012     .0057034    .0458859 
    leverage |   .0011499    .003236     0.36   0.722    -.0051926    .0074925 
     branded |    .117907   .1177893     1.00   0.317    -.1129557    .3487697 
     stock_a |   .0001099   .0000302     3.65   0.000     .0000508     .000169 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0525234   .0283425    -1.85   0.064    -.1080737     .003027 
       y1986 |  -.1273341    .272965    -0.47   0.641    -.6623357    .4076674 
       y1987 |  -.1533508   .2471871    -0.62   0.535    -.6378285     .331127 
       y1988 |  -.0312864    .225205    -0.14   0.890      -.47268    .4101072 
       y1989 |   .1870456   .2259015     0.83   0.408    -.2557132    .6298044 
       y1990 |   .5192199   .2110845     2.46   0.014     .1055019     .932938 
       y1991 |   .3021853   .2184652     1.38   0.167    -.1259987    .7303692 
       y1992 |   .2839029   .2169942     1.31   0.191     -.141398    .7092037 
       y1993 |   .0442692   .2146253     0.21   0.837    -.3763887    .4649271 
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       y1994 |   .4027005   .2109452     1.91   0.056    -.0107444    .8161455 
       y1995 |   .2898852   .1942536     1.49   0.136    -.0908449    .6706154 
       y1996 |   .1923953   .1654291     1.16   0.245    -.1318398    .5166304 
       y1997 |  -.0026853    .130814    -0.02   0.984    -.2590761    .2537054 
       y1998 |   .1915451   .1077766     1.78   0.076    -.0196932    .4027833 
       y1999 |   .0339534   .0761447     0.45   0.656    -.1152875    .1831943 
       y2001 |  -.4750673   .0687544    -6.91   0.000    -.6098234   -.3403112 
       y2002 |  -.0782955   .0943584    -0.83   0.407    -.2632346    .1066436 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   1.209007   .3790103     3.19   0.001     .4661606    1.951854 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      t_qlogf1   an_ac_a an_al_a skew_ac_al_a_stata_abs assetlog roa ind 
> um stage  assetper  leverage  branded  stock_a  rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar 
> 1) force panel(hetero) 
note: y2000 dropped due to collinearity 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.5809) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       370 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        30          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =        10 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(28)      =    205.27 
Log likelihood             = -197.3368          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    t_qlogf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0002634   .0104808    -0.03   0.980    -.0208054    .0202787 
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     an_al_a |   .0348077   .0229218     1.52   0.129    -.0101183    .0797336 
skew_ac_al~s |   .0292413   .0425542     0.69   0.492    -.0541634     .112646 
    assetlog |  -.2237539   .0423289    -5.29   0.000    -.3067169   -.1407909 
         roa |  -.1595662   .1020811    -1.56   0.118    -.3596414    .0405089 
       indum |   .0345407   .1844734     0.19   0.851    -.3270206     .396102 
       stage |   .0782264   .1011918     0.77   0.439    -.1201058    .2765587 
    assetper |   .0249778   .0113013     2.21   0.027     .0028276    .0471279 
    leverage |    .001054   .0031844     0.33   0.741    -.0051874    .0072953 
     branded |   .0907568   .1174344     0.77   0.440    -.1394104    .3209241 
     stock_a |   .0001057   .0000299     3.53   0.000      .000047    .0001644 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0493073   .0282579    -1.74   0.081    -.1046918    .0060771 
       y1986 |  -.0302728   .2805015    -0.11   0.914    -.5800456       .5195 
       y1987 |  -.0426177   .2517474    -0.17   0.866    -.5360335    .4507982 
       y1988 |  -.0341281    .222866    -0.15   0.878    -.4709375    .4026812 
       y1989 |   .1950786   .2240187     0.87   0.384      -.24399    .6341471 
       y1990 |   .5209563   .2088446     2.49   0.013     .1116285    .9302841 
       y1991 |   .2950116   .2162751     1.36   0.173    -.1288798    .7189031 
       y1992 |   .2685828   .2152994     1.25   0.212    -.1533962    .6905619 
       y1993 |   .0282705   .2127287     0.13   0.894    -.3886701     .445211 
       y1994 |   .3945704   .2088497     1.89   0.059    -.0147675    .8039083 
       y1995 |   .2906435   .1922367     1.51   0.131    -.0861336    .6674205 
       y1996 |   .2010053   .1639911     1.23   0.220    -.1204114     .522422 
       y1997 |   .0037081   .1302221     0.03   0.977    -.2515226    .2589388 
       y1998 |   .2049297   .1082444     1.89   0.058    -.0072254    .4170847 
       y1999 |   .0491128   .0774704     0.63   0.526    -.1027265     .200952 
       y2001 |  -.4735404   .0721179    -6.57   0.000    -.6148889   -.3321919 
       y2002 |  -.0792051   .0977158    -0.81   0.418    -.2707246    .1123143 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   1.221655   .3767387     3.24   0.001     .4832606    1.960049 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      t_qlogf1   an_ac_a an_al_a skew_ac_al_a_stata_abs  skew_ac_al_a_st 
> ata_sq assetlog roa indum stage  assetper  leverage  branded  stock_a  rd_i_m 
> f3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force panel(hetero) 
note: y2000 dropped due to collinearity 
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Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.5679) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       370 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        31          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =        10 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(29)      =    206.24 
Log likelihood             = -198.9085          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    t_qlogf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |   .0000118    .010313     0.00   0.999    -.0202014    .0202249 
     an_al_a |   .0346402    .022607     1.53   0.125    -.0096688    .0789492 
skew_ac_al~s |   .0285119   .1010078     0.28   0.778    -.1694598    .2264836 
skew_ac_al.. |    .001044    .041007     0.03   0.980    -.0793281    .0814162 
    assetlog |  -.2220104   .0419049    -5.30   0.000    -.3041425   -.1398783 
         roa |  -.1623645   .1025892    -1.58   0.113    -.3634357    .0387067 
       indum |   .0310586   .1801909     0.17   0.863    -.3221091    .3842262 
       stage |   .0740678   .0995782     0.74   0.457    -.1211019    .2692376 
    assetper |   .0250668   .0115521     2.17   0.030     .0024252    .0477085 
    leverage |   .0010355   .0032111     0.32   0.747    -.0052581    .0073292 
     branded |   .0901389   .1153606     0.78   0.435    -.1359637    .3162414 
     stock_a |   .0001049   .0000299     3.51   0.000     .0000463    .0001634 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0496324   .0279195    -1.78   0.075    -.1043536    .0050889 
       y1986 |  -.0290602   .2806169    -0.10   0.918    -.5790593    .5209389 
       y1987 |  -.0427832   .2523045    -0.17   0.865    -.5372908    .4517245 
       y1988 |  -.0365154   .2234861    -0.16   0.870      -.47454    .4015092 
       y1989 |   .1939604   .2248966     0.86   0.388    -.2468287    .6347496 
 106 
       y1990 |   .5207604   .2093554     2.49   0.013     .1104314    .9310894 
       y1991 |   .2904161   .2167114     1.34   0.180    -.1343304    .7151626 
       y1992 |   .2632144   .2154101     1.22   0.222    -.1589817    .6854105 
       y1993 |   .0214132   .2128457     0.10   0.920    -.3957567    .4385831 
       y1994 |   .3899641   .2089073     1.87   0.062    -.0194867    .7994148 
       y1995 |   .2870238   .1921448     1.49   0.135    -.0895732    .6636207 
       y1996 |   .1971162    .163795     1.20   0.229    -.1239162    .5181485 
       y1997 |  -.0001005   .1300999    -0.00   0.999    -.2550917    .2548907 
       y1998 |   .2040741   .1084344     1.88   0.060    -.0084534    .4166015 
       y1999 |   .0490798   .0780539     0.63   0.529     -.103903    .2020626 
       y2001 |   -.476942   .0730644    -6.53   0.000    -.6201457   -.3337384 
       y2002 |  -.0824199   .0982243    -0.84   0.401    -.2749361    .1100963 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   1.231483   .3730066     3.30   0.001     .5004038    1.962563 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      t_qlogf1  an_ac_a an_al_a  skew_an_ac_a_stata_abs   skew_an_al_a_s 
> tata_abs  assetlog roa indum stage  assetper  leverage  branded  stock_a  rd_ 
> i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force panel(hetero) 
note: y2000 dropped due to collinearity 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.5886) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       368 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        31          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  9.945946 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(29)      =    208.87 
Log likelihood             = -194.4505          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    t_qlogf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0009681   .0103113    -0.09   0.925    -.0211778    .0192417 
     an_al_a |   .0423462   .0243277     1.74   0.082    -.0053351    .0900275 
skew_an_ac~s |   .0812853   .0460426     1.77   0.077    -.0089566    .1715271 
skew_an_al~s |  -.0263488   .0477244    -0.55   0.581     -.119887    .0671893 
    assetlog |  -.2418167   .0422875    -5.72   0.000    -.3246987   -.1589347 
         roa |  -.1557806   .1018727    -1.53   0.126    -.3554474    .0438862 
       indum |  -.0049126   .1872176    -0.03   0.979    -.3718523    .3620271 
       stage |   .1022537    .100768     1.01   0.310    -.0952479    .2997552 
    assetper |   .0272035   .0119458     2.28   0.023     .0037902    .0506168 
    leverage |     .00117   .0032636     0.36   0.720    -.0052266    .0075666 
     branded |   .0720392   .1192547     0.60   0.546    -.1616957    .3057741 
     stock_a |   .0001082   .0000304     3.56   0.000     .0000486    .0001678 
    rd_i_mf3 |   -.046278   .0285943    -1.62   0.106    -.1023219    .0097659 
       y1986 |  -.1278931   .2737273    -0.47   0.640    -.6643887    .4086025 
       y1987 |  -.1690959   .2502836    -0.68   0.499    -.6596427     .321451 
       y1988 |   -.069145   .2254459    -0.31   0.759    -.5110107    .3727208 
       y1989 |     .14866   .2270935     0.65   0.513    -.2964351    .5937551 
       y1990 |   .5510517   .2114825     2.61   0.009     .1365535    .9655498 
       y1991 |    .333906   .2184821     1.53   0.126    -.0943109     .762123 
       y1992 |   .3256568   .2178764     1.49   0.135    -.1013731    .7526867 
       y1993 |   .0841397   .2149529     0.39   0.695    -.3371602    .5054395 
       y1994 |   .4337248   .2108063     2.06   0.040     .0205522    .8468975 
       y1995 |   .3129872   .1940171     1.61   0.107    -.0672795    .6932538 
       y1996 |   .2200532   .1654658     1.33   0.184    -.1042539    .5443603 
       y1997 |   .0171457   .1309216     0.13   0.896    -.2394558    .2737473 
       y1998 |   .2140268   .1082028     1.98   0.048     .0019532    .4261003 
       y1999 |    .066543   .0780131     0.85   0.394    -.0863598    .2194457 
       y2001 |  -.4584156   .0732253    -6.26   0.000    -.6019346   -.3148966 
       y2002 |  -.0515398   .0994544    -0.52   0.604    -.2464668    .1433873 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |    1.25831   .3822741     3.29   0.001      .509067    2.007554 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. xtgls      t_qlogf1  an_ac_a an_al_a skew_an_ac_a_stata_abs   skew_an_al_a_st 
> ata_abs   skew_an_ac_a_stata_sq  skew_an_al_a_stata_sq  assetlog roa indum st 
> age  assetper  leverage  branded  stock_a  rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) fo 
> rce panel(hetero) 
note: y2000 dropped due to collinearity 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.5827) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       368 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        33          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  9.945946 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(31)      =    213.09 
Log likelihood             = -193.5763          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    t_qlogf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0018951   .0100475    -0.19   0.850    -.0215878    .0177975 
     an_al_a |   .0435398   .0245057     1.78   0.076    -.0044904      .09157 
skew_an_ac~s |   .2755406   .1096704     2.51   0.012     .0605905    .4904907 
skew_an_al~s |  -.0689373   .1194209    -0.58   0.564     -.302998    .1651235 
skew_an_ac.. |  -.0717858   .0385269    -1.86   0.062    -.1472973    .0037256 
skew_an_al.. |   .0205468   .0512184     0.40   0.688    -.0798393     .120933 
    assetlog |  -.2591698    .042957    -6.03   0.000     -.343364   -.1749756 
         roa |  -.1679056   .1015614    -1.65   0.098    -.3669623    .0311512 
       indum |  -.0181977   .1826034    -0.10   0.921    -.3760938    .3396983 
       stage |     .11717   .0997445     1.17   0.240    -.0783256    .3126657 
    assetper |   .0332333   .0124953     2.66   0.008     .0087431    .0577236 
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    leverage |   .0011595   .0033053     0.35   0.726    -.0053187    .0076377 
     branded |   .0518716   .1179948     0.44   0.660     -.179394    .2831373 
     stock_a |   .0001114   .0000301     3.70   0.000     .0000523    .0001705 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0468271   .0288207    -1.62   0.104    -.1033145    .0096604 
       y1986 |  -.1082753   .2704375    -0.40   0.689    -.6383231    .4217725 
       y1987 |  -.1434625   .2475938    -0.58   0.562    -.6287373    .3418124 
       y1988 |   -.079964   .2223559    -0.36   0.719    -.5157736    .3558456 
       y1989 |   .1596037   .2243117     0.71   0.477    -.2800392    .5992467 
       y1990 |   .5585826   .2086585     2.68   0.007     .1496194    .9675458 
       y1991 |   .3401951   .2156722     1.58   0.115    -.0825147    .7629048 
       y1992 |    .331668   .2151699     1.54   0.123    -.0900572    .7533933 
       y1993 |   .0967467   .2126495     0.45   0.649    -.3200387    .5135321 
       y1994 |   .4383131    .208494     2.10   0.036     .0296725    .8469538 
       y1995 |   .3098377   .1919571     1.61   0.107    -.0663912    .6860667 
       y1996 |   .2199485   .1638875     1.34   0.180     -.101265    .5411621 
       y1997 |   .0168322   .1300367     0.13   0.897     -.238035    .2716994 
       y1998 |   .2170145   .1079359     2.01   0.044      .005464     .428565 
       y1999 |   .0581564   .0790705     0.74   0.462    -.0968189    .2131317 
       y2001 |   -.472014   .0741871    -6.36   0.000     -.617418   -.3266099 
       y2002 |  -.0555347   .0997013    -0.56   0.578    -.2509456    .1398763 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   1.294201   .3759555     3.44   0.001     .5573423    2.031061 
 
. xtgls      roaf1    an_ac_a an_al_a assetlog roa indum stage  assetper  lever 
> age  branded    rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force panel(hetero) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.0858) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       373 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        29          Obs per group: min =         2 
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                                                               avg =  10.08108 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(27)      =    434.41 
Log likelihood             =  222.6255          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       roaf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0011856   .0019809    -0.60   0.549    -.0050682    .0026969 
     an_al_a |  -.0060843   .0046749    -1.30   0.193    -.0152469    .0030783 
    assetlog |   .0080867   .0083868     0.96   0.335    -.0083511    .0245246 
         roa |   .4904614   .0476735    10.29   0.000      .397023    .5838998 
       indum |   .0182912   .0300403     0.61   0.543    -.0405867    .0771692 
       stage |   .0155706   .0126349     1.23   0.218    -.0091933    .0403346 
    assetper |   .0025429   .0038916     0.65   0.513    -.0050845    .0101704 
    leverage |  -.0018247   .0011135    -1.64   0.101    -.0040072    .0003578 
     branded |  -.0194784   .0152293    -1.28   0.201    -.0493272    .0103705 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0471055    .009602    -4.91   0.000    -.0659251    -.028286 
       y1986 |   .0587781   .1324152     0.44   0.657     -.200751    .3183072 
       y1987 |   .0437426   .1317823     0.33   0.740     -.214546    .3020313 
       y1988 |   .0511683   .1303376     0.39   0.695    -.2042887    .3066254 
       y1989 |   .0472088   .1311124     0.36   0.719    -.2097668    .3041844 
       y1990 |   .0296891   .1299686     0.23   0.819    -.2250447     .284423 
       y1991 |   .0663275    .130485     0.51   0.611    -.1894185    .3220734 
       y1992 |   .0300602   .1301873     0.23   0.817    -.2251022    .2852226 
       y1993 |   .0553994   .1300047     0.43   0.670    -.1994052    .3102039 
       y1994 |   .0597703   .1298111     0.46   0.645    -.1946547    .3141954 
       y1995 |   .0321904   .1301198     0.25   0.805    -.2228397    .2872204 
       y1996 |   .0694291   .1301982     0.53   0.594    -.1857547    .3246129 
       y1997 |    .014662   .1301288     0.11   0.910    -.2403857    .2697097 
       y1998 |   .0878949    .130251     0.67   0.500    -.1673924    .3431822 
       y1999 |   .0639286   .1298494     0.49   0.622    -.1905714    .3184287 
       y2000 |   .0550585   .1299362     0.42   0.672    -.1996117    .3097287 
       y2001 |   .0507731   .1300934     0.39   0.696    -.2042054    .3057515 
       y2002 |   .0484339   .1304401     0.37   0.710     -.207224    .3040918 
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       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -.0977528   .1324755    -0.74   0.461    -.3574001    .1618944 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      roaf1    an_ac_a an_al_a skew_ac_al_a_stata_abs assetlog roa indum 
>  stage  assetper  leverage  branded  rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force pa 
> nel(hetero) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.0826) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       371 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        30          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  10.02703 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(28)      =    437.64 
Log likelihood             =  219.0916          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       roaf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0013196    .002016    -0.65   0.513    -.0052708    .0026317 
     an_al_a |  -.0059201   .0046967    -1.26   0.207    -.0151254    .0032851 
skew_ac_al~s |    .001386   .0115662     0.12   0.905    -.0212832    .0240553 
    assetlog |    .008822   .0084737     1.04   0.298    -.0077862    .0254301 
         roa |   .4908905    .047714    10.29   0.000     .3973728    .5844082 
       indum |   .0189414   .0299692     0.63   0.527    -.0397971    .0776799 
       stage |   .0140295   .0127378     1.10   0.271    -.0109361    .0389952 
    assetper |   .0024649   .0039341     0.63   0.531    -.0052458    .0101756 
    leverage |  -.0018267   .0011153    -1.64   0.101    -.0040126    .0003592 
     branded |  -.0207278   .0153563    -1.35   0.177    -.0508255    .0093699 
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    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0472217   .0095848    -4.93   0.000    -.0660076   -.0284359 
       y1986 |   .0793037   .1357884     0.58   0.559    -.1868366    .3454439 
       y1987 |   .0512342   .1339997     0.38   0.702    -.2114005    .3138688 
       y1988 |   .0504686   .1300361     0.39   0.698    -.2043976    .3053347 
       y1989 |   .0469707   .1306477     0.36   0.719    -.2090942    .3030355 
       y1990 |    .029264   .1295444     0.23   0.821    -.2246385    .2831664 
       y1991 |   .0655919    .130058     0.50   0.614    -.1893171    .3205009 
       y1992 |   .0295624   .1297808     0.23   0.820    -.2248032    .2839281 
       y1993 |   .0548816    .129566     0.42   0.672     -.199063    .3088263 
       y1994 |   .0591017   .1293759     0.46   0.648    -.1944705    .3126738 
       y1995 |   .0316158   .1296577     0.24   0.807    -.2225086    .2857403 
       y1996 |   .0686498   .1297474     0.53   0.597    -.1856504    .3229501 
       y1997 |   .0135756   .1296936     0.10   0.917    -.2406192    .2677704 
       y1998 |   .0869753   .1298018     0.67   0.503    -.1674315     .341382 
       y1999 |   .0630366   .1294552     0.49   0.626    -.1906909    .3167641 
       y2000 |   .0540727   .1295578     0.42   0.676    -.1998559    .3080013 
       y2001 |   .0495724   .1296896     0.38   0.702    -.2046146    .3037594 
       y2002 |   .0469778   .1301203     0.36   0.718    -.2080532    .3020088 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -.0982898   .1319898    -0.74   0.456    -.3569851    .1604055 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      roaf1    an_ac_a an_al_a skew_ac_al_a_stata_abs  skew_ac_al_a_stat 
> a_sq assetlog roa indum stage  assetper  leverage  branded   rd_i_mf3 y1986-y 
> 2003, corr(ar1) force panel(hetero) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.0674) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       371 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        31          Obs per group: min =         2 
 113 
                                                               avg =  10.02703 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(29)      =    463.60 
Log likelihood             =  221.8388          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       roaf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0014608   .0019738    -0.74   0.459    -.0053294    .0024078 
     an_al_a |  -.0065638   .0046385    -1.42   0.157    -.0156551    .0025276 
skew_ac_al~s |   .0458833   .0254182     1.81   0.071    -.0039354    .0957021 
skew_ac_al.. |  -.0215234   .0113982    -1.89   0.059    -.0438634    .0008166 
    assetlog |   .0064757   .0083592     0.77   0.439    -.0099081    .0228595 
         roa |    .497205   .0471912    10.54   0.000     .4047119    .5896981 
       indum |   .0210041   .0297206     0.71   0.480    -.0372471    .0792554 
       stage |   .0165666   .0126671     1.31   0.191    -.0082604    .0413936 
    assetper |    .002912   .0037489     0.78   0.437    -.0044358    .0102597 
    leverage |  -.0018554   .0011123    -1.67   0.095    -.0040354    .0003246 
     branded |  -.0213725   .0151598    -1.41   0.159    -.0510852    .0083403 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0468564   .0094106    -4.98   0.000    -.0653008   -.0284119 
       y1986 |   .0797802    .134255     0.59   0.552    -.1833547    .3429151 
       y1987 |   .0504781   .1325194     0.38   0.703    -.2092552    .3102113 
       y1988 |   .0399096   .1288493     0.31   0.757    -.2126303    .2924496 
       y1989 |   .0407868   .1293156     0.32   0.752    -.2126671    .2942407 
       y1990 |   .0247555   .1282918     0.19   0.847    -.2266918    .2762027 
       y1991 |   .0585885   .1287504     0.46   0.649    -.1937577    .3109347 
       y1992 |   .0271023    .128439     0.21   0.833    -.2246335     .278838 
       y1993 |   .0516352   .1282672     0.40   0.687    -.1997638    .3030343 
       y1994 |   .0553994   .1280659     0.43   0.665    -.1956052    .3064039 
       y1995 |    .028875   .1283458     0.22   0.822    -.2226781    .2804281 
       y1996 |   .0659313   .1284366     0.51   0.608    -.1857998    .3176623 
       y1997 |   .0184477   .1283938     0.14   0.886    -.2331996     .270095 
       y1998 |   .0877915   .1284859     0.68   0.494    -.1640363    .3396192 
       y1999 |   .0687076   .1282304     0.54   0.592    -.1826194    .3200345 
       y2000 |   .0539517   .1282321     0.42   0.674    -.1973785     .305282 
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       y2001 |    .053365    .128374     0.42   0.678    -.1982433    .3049733 
       y2002 |   .0447142   .1287986     0.35   0.728    -.2077264    .2971549 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -.0988954   .1305791    -0.76   0.449    -.3548257    .1570349 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      roaf1   an_ac_a an_al_a  skew_an_ac_a_stata_abs   skew_an_al_a_sta 
> ta_abs  assetlog roa indum stage  assetper  leverage  branded  rd_i_mf3 y1986 
> -y2003, corr(ar1) force panel(hetero) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.0787) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       369 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        31          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  9.972973 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(29)      =    447.34 
Log likelihood             =  217.8508          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       roaf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0013501   .0020079    -0.67   0.501    -.0052856    .0025854 
     an_al_a |  -.0050283   .0048858    -1.03   0.303    -.0146044    .0045478 
skew_an_ac~s |   .0179385   .0119205     1.50   0.132    -.0054253    .0413024 
skew_an_al~s |  -.0084184   .0120049    -0.70   0.483    -.0319477    .0151108 
    assetlog |    .006741   .0084308     0.80   0.424     -.009783     .023265 
         roa |   .4857402   .0479364    10.13   0.000     .3917865    .5796939 
       indum |    .014734   .0311986     0.47   0.637    -.0464141    .0758822 
       stage |   .0185762   .0124047     1.50   0.134    -.0057366     .042889 
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    assetper |   .0026837   .0042909     0.63   0.532    -.0057263    .0110937 
    leverage |  -.0017364   .0011001    -1.58   0.114    -.0038925    .0004197 
     branded |  -.0229857   .0156979    -1.46   0.143     -.053753    .0077816 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0464919   .0094882    -4.90   0.000    -.0650884   -.0278954 
       y1986 |   .0620892   .1310751     0.47   0.636    -.1948132    .3189916 
       y1987 |   .0386531   .1311136     0.29   0.768    -.2183248     .295631 
       y1988 |   .0336482   .1293947     0.26   0.795    -.2199608    .2872572 
       y1989 |   .0424705   .1301024     0.33   0.744    -.2125254    .2974665 
       y1990 |   .0308182    .128918     0.24   0.811    -.2218564    .2834927 
       y1991 |   .0691109       .129     0.54   0.592    -.1837244    .3219462 
       y1992 |    .033444   .1286789     0.26   0.795     -.218762      .28565 
       y1993 |   .0587445   .1283419     0.46   0.647     -.192801      .31029 
       y1994 |   .0625041    .128075     0.49   0.626    -.1885183    .3135265 
       y1995 |   .0359701   .1283811     0.28   0.779    -.2156522    .2875925 
       y1996 |   .0703236   .1284515     0.55   0.584    -.1814367    .3220839 
       y1997 |   .0124507    .128435     0.10   0.923    -.2392772    .2641786 
       y1998 |   .0881054   .1285483     0.69   0.493    -.1638446    .3400555 
       y1999 |   .0704842   .1284841     0.55   0.583      -.18134    .3223084 
       y2000 |   .0594936   .1284899     0.46   0.643    -.1923419    .3113292 
       y2001 |   .0500399    .128592     0.39   0.697    -.2019958    .3020755 
       y2002 |   .0483189   .1289698     0.37   0.708    -.2044572     .301095 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -.0975964   .1311156    -0.74   0.457    -.3545782    .1593854 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtgls      roaf1   an_ac_a an_al_a skew_an_ac_a_stata_abs   skew_an_al_a_stat 
> a_abs   skew_an_ac_a_stata_sq  skew_an_al_a_stata_sq  assetlog roa indum stag 
> e  assetper  leverage  branded rd_i_mf3 y1986-y2003, corr(ar1) force panel(he 
> tero) 
 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic 
Correlation:   common AR(1) coefficient for all panels  (0.0524) 
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Estimated covariances      =        37          Number of obs      =       369 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Number of groups   =        37 
Estimated coefficients     =        33          Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =  9.972973 
                                                               max =        17 
                                                Wald chi2(31)      =    506.85 
Log likelihood             =  220.2658          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       roaf1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     an_ac_a |  -.0021434   .0019642    -1.09   0.275    -.0059931    .0017063 
     an_al_a |  -.0070332    .004875    -1.44   0.149     -.016588    .0025215 
skew_an_ac~s |   .0564825   .0268133     2.11   0.035     .0039294    .1090357 
skew_an_al~s |   .0298814   .0270117     1.11   0.269    -.0230607    .0828234 
skew_an_ac.. |   -.016625   .0104796    -1.59   0.113    -.0371647    .0039147 
skew_an_al.. |  -.0168754   .0123799    -1.36   0.173    -.0411395    .0073888 
    assetlog |   .0030122   .0083829     0.36   0.719     -.013418    .0194423 
         roa |    .491605   .0470891    10.44   0.000     .3993121     .583898 
       indum |    .016616   .0309906     0.54   0.592    -.0441244    .0773565 
       stage |   .0252245   .0128707     1.96   0.050    -1.52e-06    .0504506 
    assetper |   .0032773   .0043402     0.76   0.450    -.0052293    .0117838 
    leverage |  -.0015934   .0010825    -1.47   0.141     -.003715    .0005283 
     branded |  -.0205433   .0153578    -1.34   0.181    -.0506441    .0095574 
    rd_i_mf3 |  -.0465658   .0091738    -5.08   0.000     -.064546   -.0285855 
       y1986 |   .0654247   .1283099     0.51   0.610    -.1860581    .3169076 
       y1987 |   .0442324   .1283908     0.34   0.730     -.207409    .2958739 
       y1988 |   .0257415   .1271041     0.20   0.840     -.223378     .274861 
       y1989 |   .0394076   .1274835     0.31   0.757    -.2104555    .2892706 
       y1990 |   .0243953   .1265288     0.19   0.847    -.2235966    .2723872 
       y1991 |   .0609534   .1264462     0.48   0.630    -.1868767    .3087834 
       y1992 |   .0259802   .1261001     0.21   0.837    -.2211714    .2731318 
       y1993 |   .0506483   .1258616     0.40   0.687    -.1960359    .2973324 
       y1994 |   .0594774   .1255039     0.47   0.636    -.1865057    .3054604 
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       y1995 |   .0311527   .1258328     0.25   0.804    -.2154752    .2777805 
       y1996 |   .0681255   .1259035     0.54   0.588    -.1786409    .3148919 
       y1997 |   .0215887   .1259055     0.17   0.864    -.2251815    .2683589 
       y1998 |    .088704   .1259952     0.70   0.481    -.1582421    .3356501 
       y1999 |   .0759054   .1260318     0.60   0.547    -.1711124    .3229233 
       y2000 |   .0611441   .1260242     0.49   0.628    -.1858587    .3081469 
       y2001 |   .0539183   .1261547     0.43   0.669    -.1933403    .3011769 
       y2002 |   .0493916   .1264699     0.39   0.696     -.198485    .2972681 
       y2003 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -.1010998   .1285689    -0.79   0.432    -.3530903    .1508907 
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